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Rethinking the Development of




The history of patents does not begin with inventions, but rather
with royal grants by Queen Elizabeth (1558-1603) for monopoly
privileges that advanced her economic and industrial policies.
Approximately 200 years after the end of Elizabeth's reign, however,
a patent represents a legal right obtained by an inventor providing for
exclusive control over the production and sale of his mechanical or
scientific invention. What accounts for this radical shift from a grant
by royal prerogative to common-law property right?
There is no dearth of proffered explanations. A common
viewpoint is that the crown's grants of letters patent for
manufacturing monopolies were simply part of the constitutional
conflicts that plagued the English government during the seventeenth
century.1 Others view the birth and evolution of patents through the
conceptual framework of economics.2 Still others offer institutional
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drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank the Bradley Foundation for its generous
support, which made it possible for me to complete this article before my graduation from
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1. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 349 (1924)
("The common law was thus called upon [in Darcy v. Allen] to settle a delicate
constitutional question, of vital importance to the trade of the country.").
2. See, e.g., Paul E. Schaafsma, An Economic Overview of Patents, 79 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 241, 242-45 (1997) ("the historical development of patent rights
demonstrates that patents developed as a tool of economic development").
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and social explanations for the evolution of patents from royal
prerogative to common-law doctrine.3
Regardless of the theoretical schema scholars have used to
explain the history of patents, everyone agrees that natural rights
theories played no part whatsoever in this story. "Even in the heyday
of natural rights [in] the late eighteenth century," writes Christine
MacLeod, "it made little progress against the appeal to precedent and
statute law."'4 Edward Walterscheid writes that "care must be taken
to avoid any misapprehension that the states issuing privileges under
patents of monopoly characterized and identified those privileges as
property rights per se .... [because nowhere] was there any legal
guarantee of a property right to or in -a patent privilege." 5 H. I.
Dutton puts it bluntly when he says that "the natural-law theory of
property in inventions' was rarely advanced by supporters of
patents.... Occasionally some writers would resort to the argument,
but no worthwhile commentator took it seriously." 6
The broadly accepted view that patents developed sans
intellectual support from the natural rights philosophers is not
without evidentiary support. The (Benthamite) Westminster Review
declared in 1829 that "to talk of the natural rights of an inventor is to
talk nonsense."'7 A leading nineteenth-century patent attorney wrote
that "[t]hose who believe the inventor to have a natural right... must
3. See, e.g., CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION:
THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660-1800 51, 53 (1988) (noting that the rise of the
specification requirement "helped shift responsibility from the law officers to the courts"
and thus "offered a mechanism whereby the system could be self-policing and the law
officers be spared much tedious investigation").
4. lId at 197.
5. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:
Antecedents (Part 1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 697, 715 (1994) [hereinafter
Walterscheid, Part 1].
6. H. I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1852 18 (1984).
7. Id. (quoting The Patent Laws, 26 WESTMINSTER REVIEW 329 (1829)). In reading
this statement, one cannot help but think of Jeremy Bentham's renowned claim that
"natural rights are nonsense on stilts." (emphasis added). 2 JEREMY BENTHAM,
Anarchical Fallacies, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 489, 491 (John Bowring ed.,
1843).
Moreover, the influence of Bentham's utilitarianism on the policy justification for
patent law is far from circumstantial. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the utilitarian
claim that inventors are given a "monopoly" in exchange for the benefit they confer on
society is omnipresent in patent treatises. See THOMAS TERRELL, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE RELATING TO LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 1 (1884) ("It was to the
advantage of the whole community that inventors should be rewarded"); JOHN CORYTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LETTERS-PATENT 36-37 (1855) (quoting Bentham to
illustrate the "principle of patents").
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have an entire misconception as what it is the inventor really
achieves." s  In 1769, Justice Yates appeared to deny at least a
Lockean conception of a natural right of inventors by arguing "that
the mere labour and study of the inventor, how intense and ingenious
soever it may be, will establish no property in the invention, will
establish no right to exclude others from making the same instrument,
when once the inventor shall have published it."9 On the basis of this
sort of evidence, it cannot be said that Walterscheid, MacLeod, et al.
are fundamentally mistaken.
It is my intention, nonetheless, to offer a modest challenge to the
prevailing view that the ideas of the natural rights philosophers did
not influence the early development of patent law. The validity or
significance of constitutional, social, economic or institutional
analyses of legal history is not in doubt; intellectual history is not
exclusive of these other approaches to historical analysis.10 Yet, an
intellectual history of the early development of patents is glaringly
absent from the substantial work already done in this field.
While recognizing that economics, politics and constitutional law
all had a role in the development of patent rights, this article will
explain how English lawyers and jurists drew upon natural-law
conceptions of the social contract and the moral significance of labor,
and, in this way, the natural-law philosophers shaped much of the
initial common-law definition of patent rights. This is evident in the
general insights of some modem commentators, such as Harold Fox,
who states in one of the most cited works in the literature on the
history of patents that "the origin of this type of property is in
production and is based upon the theory that every man is entitled to
the fruits of his own labour."11 Furthermore, Walterscheid himself
acknowledges that the development of patent law between 1600 and
1800 involved a fundamental change from "viewing a patent as a
8. DUTTON, supra note 6, at 18 (quoting THOMAS WEBSTER, LAW AND PRACTICE
OF LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTION 3 (1841)).
9. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2387, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769). Yates is
arguing, in part, that the absence of any natural right to inventions is a ground for denying
that authors have any natural right to their written works.
10. Barry Cushman, a legal historian, recently wrote in a different context, "legal
history is not simply political history, or social history, or economic history; legal history is
also intellectual history." BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:
THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 41 (1998).
11. HAROLD Fox, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND
FUTURE OF THE PATENT MONOPOLY 4 (1947) (emphasis added). Interestingly, Fox does
not discuss the issue of property in inventions beyond his first two chapters, and his book
contains no mention of John Locke or of natural rights.
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contract between the crown and the patentee to viewing it as a 'social
contract' between the patentee and society."'12 This fundamental shift
in the law occurred at approximately the same time as the natural-
rights theories of Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and John Locke
became popular political and legal currency in England.13 Does this
reflect historical happenstance or did these natural rights
philosophers exert an intellectual influence over the development of
the legal doctrine of patents?
This Article will thus seek to inject some intellectual history into
our understanding of the history of patents. The article is divided
into three sections. Part I discusses the initial development of
monopoly grants under the English crown's prerogative to issue
letters patent to industrialists, roughly spanning the periods between
Queen Elizabeth's reign and the passage of the Statute of Monopolies
in 1626. Part II discusses the chaotic evolutionary period of patents in
the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, showing how
different political, institutional and intellectual forces were at work in
creating a period of flux and change in the issuance and enforcement
of patents. Part III concludes the article with explaining how the
common-law courts acquired jurisdiction over patents in the mid-
eighteenth century, and how common-law jurists, such as Lord
Mansfield, reconceptualized the definition of patents according to the
moral and political framework set forth by the natural rights
philosophy of John Locke. Although natural rights philosophy is not
the only source for the evolution of patents from royal prerogative to
legally recognized property right, this Article will show how this
intellectual influence nonetheless played a fundamental role in this
legal and political sea change.
12. Edward J. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:
Antecedents (Part 3), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 771, 793 (1995) [hereinafter
Walterscheid, Part 3] (emphasis added).
13. See generally 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 1-115 (Robert M. Kerr ed., 4th ed., 1876) (1768). "By the absolute rights of
individuals, we mean those which are so in their primary and strictest sense; such as would
belong to their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to
enjoy, whether out of society or in it." Id at 96.
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I. Early Patent Doctrine: Royal Prerogative and Monopoly
Privileges
A. Birth of Patents: Letters Patent and Industrial Development
The term "patent" reveals that the origin of this legal device rests
in the royal prerogative of granting letters patent. Blackstone writes:
The king's .... grants, whether of land, honors, liberties,
franchises, or aught besides, are contained in charters, or letters
patent, that is, open letters, literae patentes: so called, because they
are not sealed up, but exposed to open view, with the great seal
pendant at the bottom; and are usually directed or addressed by the
king to all his subjects at large.' 4
The crown's prerogative to issue letters patent was a central tool in
bestowing privileges upon individuals in the furtherance of royal
policies. When the crown thus wished to buttress the realm's lagging
industrial development at the end of the Middle Ages, the issuance of
letters patent was central to enticing tradesmen and industrialists to
come to England.15 This policy is the progenitor of the doctrine of
patents for inventions.
Beginning in the fourteenth century, King Edward III began
issuing letters patent of protection for foreigners willing to come to
England to train his subjects in their respective trades.16 The first
such instance of a grant was in 1331 to John Kempe of Flanders. 7 In
essence, these early letters patent functioned like passports for any
14. 2 id. at 316-17. Holdsworth writes that "[t]he kings of England did much of the
business of the state by means of charters, letters patent, and letters close.... Letters
patent were used to set forth their public directives, of whatever sort, whereas letters close
were used to provide private instructions to individuals. Royal charters or letters patent
often were similar in content and differed only in their form." 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 1, at 182.
15. See, e.g., SIR MATrHEw HALE, THE PREROGATIVES OF THE KING 260-61 (D.E.C.
Yale ed., 1976). "[I]ndenization by the king... is a grant by letters patent [to an alien,
either person, location or corporation] .... Indenization of the person... is a grant by
particular patent to a man... with power to implead, purchase and alien, and to enjoy all
the liberties of a subject." Id.
16. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 10. There is a rich and detailed history prior to the
fourteenth century concerning patent monopoly grants in Italy, the monopoly grants to
guilds to protect "craft knowledge," and the eventual importation of this practice to
England. This historical progression is discussed in various works, including Walterscheid,
Part 1, supra note 5, at 699-712, and Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the
English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 615, 617-23 (1959).
17. Pat. 5 Edw. III, p. I, m. 25 (1331). For the Latin text of the grant, see E. Wyndham
Hulme, The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at Common Law, 12 L.
Q. R. 141, 142 (1896) [hereinafter Hulme, History]. The letter patent to Kempe was later
confirmed by Parliament, see 11 Edw. III, c. 5 (1337).
foreigners willing to come and establish their trade within the realm.'
8
Professor Ramon Klitzke notes that the letter patent to Kempe
represented "the beginning of a deliberate and vigorous policy to
expand English industry which Edward III and his successors pursued
with excellent results.'
Yet it was not until the sixteenth century that the crown began
issuing letters patent to individuals for manufacturing monopolies
within England.20 Edward VI granted the first such letter patent to
Henry Smyth in 1552. The king's grant to Smyth states that he is
supposed to introduce the
brode glasse of like fasshion and goodes to that which is commonly
called Normandy glasse which shall not only be a great commoditie
to our said realme and dominions but also bothe in the price of the
glasse aforesaid and otherwise a benefite to our subjectes and
besydes that dyvers of theym maye be sett to worke and get their
lyvying and in tyme learne and be hable to make said glasse them
selfe and so from tyme to tyme instructe the others in that science
and feate.21
In exchange, Smyth is granted a twenty-year monopoly in the
production of Normandy glass, during which time:
No manner of person or persons not licensed, or auctorized by the
said Henry Smyth as is afore mentioned shall attempte or presume
to make any kynde of the said brode glasse commonly wount to be
called Normandy glasse or any other fytte for wyndowes upon
peyne or forfayture of all the same glasse by any of theym so to be
made and as they and any of ,theym regarde our expresse
comaundment and entende too avoyde that trouble and perell
which shall ernestly and indelayedly insue in this behalfe.22
The significance of Smyth's monopoly patent is that it unequivocally
expresses the elements of the monopoly privilege that Queen
Elizabeth would soon implement with vigor.
The grant to Smyth requires him: (i) to bring to England the
foreign trade of manufacturing "Normandy glass," (ii) to benefit the
overall realm by lowering prices and increasing the number of
commodities, and (iii) to train Englishmen in the production of
18. Klitzke, supra note 16, at 624.
19. Id. at 625.
20. See FOX, supra note 11, at 25-26 (noting that the term "monopoly" did not come
into parlance in England until the sixteenth century, and that by the end of "the century it
had come into common use and was widely employed in Parliament to describe the system
of patents used by Elizabeth for the granting of exclusive rights").
21. Klitzke, supra note 16, at 629.
22. Id. at 629-30.
1260 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
August 2001] RETHINKING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENTS 1261
"Normandy glass." In exchange for these commitments, Edward III
grants Smyth a twenty-year monopoly in which anyone who produces
Normandy glass without his license shall do so under the threat of
"pain or forfeiture."
In other words, under the early grant of letters patent, a patentee
was supposed to: (i) work the patent, i.e., bring a foreign industry
into the realm, (ii) not be inconvenient to other subjects, i.e., not
interfere with established industries, and (iii) train apprentices, i.e.,
create a self-sufficient industry within the realm through which
English subjects can make a living. Insofar as a patentee met all three
of these conditions, the crown would exercise its prerogative and
issue a letter patent for a monopoly in the respective trade3P
This is important because it indicates that letters patent had
nothing to do with legal rights or even inventions per se, but rather
they represented royal privileges that supported royal policies. In this
case, the royal policy was the introduction of new industries and
manufactures to the realm, and the royal privilege was a monopoly
grant ascertained through a letter patent. The use-and abuse-of
this royal privilege was exemplified in Queen Elizabeth's monopoly
grants, which proved to be the catalyst for the next two hundred years
of evolving patent doctrine.
Queen Elizabeth engaged, according to Walterscheid, in "a
concerted effort.., to stimulate domestic production of both raw
materials and a wide variety of manufactured goods previously
imported from abroad. '24 In pursuing this national economic policy,
Elizabeth would grant a total of fifty-five monopolies between 1561
and 1603-twenty-one of which went to foreigners.25 The initial grant
to Henry Smyth was now an established power of the crown that was
23. The original patent monopolies were manufacturing monopolies and did not grant
privileges to monopolize sales of the goods. 4 HoLDSWoRTH, supra note 1, at 345. With
the degradation in the use of the royal prerogative to grant monopolies, of course,
monopolies were soon extended to sales of goods, see infra note 44 and accompanying
text.
24. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:
Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 849, 855 (1994) [hereinafter
Walterscheid, Part 2].
25. E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at
Common Law: A Sequel, 16 L.Q.R. 44, 52 (1900) [hereinafter Hulme, History Sequel].
Notably, nineteen of these twenty-one grants to foreigners were issued between 1561 and
1580; this indicates the degree to which Elizabeth eventually succumbed to her ability to
act on royal whim and thus use her prerogative in ways that did not further her initial
economic policy. Id
dispensed and adjudicated by the prerogative court of the Privy
Council.26
In fact, Queen Elizabeth's initial use of her prerogative in issuing
letters patent for monopolies followed the conditions and goals set
out in Smyth's grant. For instance, a monopoly patent in 1562 to
"make ovens and furnaces" states that the grant would be voided if
the patentees failed to put it into practice within two months.27 A
monopoly patent in 1567 for the manufacture of window glass
demanded as a condition for the validity of the grant that the French
patentees train Englishmen in this trade.28 The consideration offered
to the Queen in exchange for a monopoly privilege initially served the
ultimate purpose of creating a self-sufficient economy in England.
Furthermore, the requirement that the patent monopoly cannot
be "inconvenient" to subjects was articulated as a requirement that a
monopoly cannot displace an existing trade within the realm. The
logic of this rule is straightforward. If the crown's use of monopoly
patents serves the purpose of introducing new industries to the realm,
then such patents cannot be granted when the industry already exists
therein.
This limiting rule was central to a dispute before the Privy
Council concerning Elizabeth's twenty-fifth monopoly patent,
granted in 1571, to "Rd. Mathewe to make 'Turkye haftes' for
knives. '29 Viner's Abridgement offers the following summary of what
had become known as Matthey's case:
So where a patent was granted to A. for the sole making of
knives with bone hafts, and plates of lattin; because, as the patents
suggested, he brought the first use thereof from beyond seas; yet
nevertheless, when the wardens of the company of cutlers shewed
before some of the council, and some learned in the law, that they
used to make knives before, though not with such hafts; and that
26. Queen Elizabeth's fifth patent monopoly grant in 1562 to John Medley, for
instance, states that any disputes concerning the grant should be addressed by the Privy
Council. Hulme, History, supra note 17, at 146. For a brief statement on the origins and
jurisdiction of the Privy Council, see THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW 205-06 (5th ed., 1956).
27. Hulme, History, supra note 17, at 146. Another monopoly grant in 1571 to Sir
Thomas Goldinge for "an engine for land drainage and water supply" required that he
build his engine within two years or the patent would be voided. Hulme, History Sequel,
supra note 25, at 45.
28. Hulme, History, supra note 17, at 149. An earlier monopoly grant in 1561 "to
make white sope" required at least two of the patentee's workers to be of "native birth."
Id. at 145.
29. Hulme, History Sequel, supra note 25, at 45. The date of what has now become
known as "Mathey's case" or "Matthey's case" is unknown.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
August 2001] RETHINKING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENTS 1263
such a light difference or invention should be no cause to restrain
them; thereupon he could never have benefit of this patent,
although he laboured very greatly therein. 30
Coke's Institutes reports that another monopoly patent was
implicated in 1572
in Bircots case for a priviledge concerning the preparing and
melting, &c. of lead ore: for there it was said, that that was to put
but a new button to an old coat; and it is much easier to adde then
to invent. And there it was also resolved, that.., no old
manufacture in use before can be prohibited.31
These cases-especially Bircot's case, whose holding would remain
good law within England for the next two centuries-further
translated the rule against restraint of pre-existing trade into a rule
that the king cannot grant patent monopolies for "mere
improvements." A patent monopoly could only issue for an entirely
new trade, or at least a trade that had not existed within the realm for
a reasonable time prior to the grant.32
This limitation was generally accepted because "[e]mployment
was largely sacrosanct," writes Walterscheid, "and strong efforts were
made to avoid the granting of patent[s] ... perceived to infringe on
the livelihoods of established workers. ' 33 This view is substantiated
by Lord Coke's own argument against monopolies: "a mans trade is
accounted his life, because it maintaineth his life; and therefore the
monopolist that taketh away a mans trade, taketh away his life, and
therefore is so much the more odious." 34 Thus, the two rules that
derived from these arguments-no monopoly patents either for
trades existing at the time of the grant or for mere improvements
upon such existing trades-constituted the only real limitation
imposed upon the early patent monopolies. 35
30. 17 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OFLAW AND EQUITY 210-11 (2d
ed., 1793) (citing Mathey's Case, Noy 113). In Darcy v. Allen, counsel for defendant, Mr.
Fuller, refers to Matthey's case in support of his argument that Darcy's patent monopoly
should be adjudged void, see Noy 183,74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B. 1603).
31. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 183 (1797) (1644).
32. E. Wyndham Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and Present,
13 L.Q.R. 313,318 (1897) [hereinafter Hulme, Patent Grant].
33. Walterscheid, Part 2, supra note 24, at 859.
34. 3 CoKE, supra note 31, at 181.
35. The rule of "no grants for existing trades" would eventually be transformed into
the novelty requirement for patent grants. The rule of "no grants for mere improvements"
would eventually be overruled by Lord Mansfield's jury instructions in Morris v. Bramson,
1 Carp. P.C. 30 (1776). See infra note 219.
For most of the case citations, I am using a nineteenth-century collection of patent
cases, called Carpmael's Law Reports of Patent Cases (identified as Carp. P.C.). In the
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More important, contemporary readers should not misinterpret
the references to "invention" in both Bircot's and Matthey's cases.
The modern understanding of this term suggests that it is "an act or
operation of finding out something new... something not previously
known or existing, by the exercise of independent investigation and
experiment. ' 36 On the other hand, in issuing the early patent
monopolies
the Crown and Courts alike recognized two classes of
individuals... as the proper recipients of royal favor, (1) the
bringer-in or importer, (2) the first finder or inventor-the latter
grounding his title to favourable consideration on the fact that he
possessed in common with the importer the qualification of
introducing a new industry within the realm. In other words, the
rights of the inventor are derived from those of the importer, and
not vice versa as is commonly supposed.37
The purpose of the early monopoly patents was to establish a new
industry within the realm-with the principal focus on importation.
This explains why the early patents were not automatically voided if it
was known that the trade was in use during an earlier period of time
but had then gone out of use in the realm: in these cases the grants
served the similar purpose of reestablishing an industry within
England. Thus, as long as the patentee was not infringing upon the
customary right to work in one's trade, i.e., as long as a patentee was
not attempting to "put a new button on an old coat" or to "taketh
away a mans trade," then he was accorded the status of "inventor"
insofar as he was the first to establish (or re-establish) his respective
trade within the realm.
B. Abuse of the Royal Prerogative in Issuing Patent Monopolies
Queen Elizabeth, nonetheless, considered her power to dispense
monopoly grants through letters patent to be an unfettered
prerogative of the crown. When Parliament began agitating in 1571
over the royal policy of granting patent monopolies, Elizabeth's
response to these "audacious, arrogant and presumptuous" officials
was pointed: "We are to let you understand, her Majesty's pleasure
Preface, William Carpmael explains that his "object in publishing these reports is to
advance a correct knowledge of the subject amongst those most interested-the patentee,
the inventor, and the manufacturer, in the hope that patented inventions may be still
better secured, and litigation lessened." 1 Carp. P.C. at vii (1843). It is my hope that his
efforts will assist those interested in the full history of patents to better secure an
understanding of this subject as well.
36. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 824 (6th ed. 1990).
37. Hulme, History, supra note 17, at 152.
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in that behalf that her Prerogative Royall may not be called in
question for the valliditie of the letters patents.1 38 "
It was not long, however, before Elizabeth began to dispense
monopoly patents as rewards for political patronage. Between 1581
and 1603, Queen Elizabeth granted twenty monopoly patents, but
only two of these monopolies were issued to foreigners.39 Moreover,
the Queen rejected the petitions of numerous subjects who had
created real inventions under their own initiative, including, among
others, a stocking frame, Harrington's water closet, and armor plate.40
Although Coke overstates the matter, he was not far from the mark
when he declared that "monopolies in time past were ever without
law, but never without friends." 41
During Queen Elizabeth's reign, the Privy Council's records are
replete with patent monopolies issuing regardless of whether an
industry was new to the realm or not, which was the original purpose
and justification for the issuance of such letters patent. In 1598, for
example, the Privy Council issued an open warrant for Jerome
Bowes' monopoly patent on the production and sale of drinking
glasses. The declaration read in part:
Whereas yt pleased the Queen's Majestie to graunt by her letters
patentes under the Great Seale of England unto Sir Jerome Bowes,
knight,... lycence for the makinge of drincking glasses within her
Highnes' realmes of England and Ireland, with awthority besides to
restraine the makinge of any of the said glasses within her Majesty's
said realmes to anie person or persons whatsoever other then to
those which the said Sir Jerome Bowes shall appoint.., and also
that none of her Majesty's subjectes or other denyzon or straunger
shall bringe or transport anie of the said drinckinge glasses.., into
either of bothe her Majesty's said realmes .... [and none] shall
trangresse or oppose them selves against the auethoritie of her
Highnes' letters patentes ... in contempt of her Highnes' Royall
Prerogative by sondry persons .... 42
Another declaration by the Privy Council in 1600 extended a previous
patent monopoly to the patentee's widow:
An open warraunt with generall direction to all her Majesty's
publique officers. Whereas her Majestie gave unto Richard
38. Walterscheid, Part 2, supra note 24, at 863 (citing E. B. INLOW, THE PATENT
GRANT 21 (1950)).
39. Hulme, History Sequel, supra note 25, at 52.
40. Id. at 53.
41. 3 COKE, supra note 31, at 182.
42. 29 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL 1598-1599, at 101-02 (August 25, 1598) (John R.
Dasent ed., 1974) (emphasis added).
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Matthew, deceassed, a speciall licence for the sole making, buying
and selling of traine oile within this realm in consideration of the
longe and faithfull service by him donne unto her Highnes, which
licence sithence his decease hath bin renewed by her Majestie unto
Elizabeth Matthew, his wife, for the terme of [21] yeares.43
These grants reflected important changes from earlier monopolies:
first, the grants provide for monopolies over both manufacture and
sales,44 and second, neither of the grants mentions the creation or
establishment of new industries as consideration for the letters
patent.45 Matthew's letter patent goes so far as to state that his
consideration for the grant is his "long and faithful service" to the
Queen-hardly the same thing as the introduction of new industries!
Queen Elizabeth's abuse of her royal prerogative went even
further. Additional monopoly grants were issued for the production
and sale of vinegar, of starch and of playing cards. 46 Needless to say,
all of these industries existed in the realm at the time of the grant.
Thus, the standard justification for monopoly grants-the
introduction of new industries and the creation of a self-sufficient
economy-was not only lacking, but these monopolies also violated
the liberty of the subjects to work in their respective trades.
The playing card monopoly granted to Edward Darcy in 1598
proved particularly egregious, providing for Darcy's complete
monopolization over all manufacture, importation and sales of
playing cards. Darcy felt no compunction in enforcing his privilege;
he appealed to the Privy Council in 1600, for instance, to do
something about violators of his monopoly grant. The Council
responded by declaring that "dyverse obstinate and undutyfull
persons, as in contempte of... her Majesty's prerogative, have of late
wilfuUy and publiquely impugned it .... shalbe taken and
commytted to pryson." 47 Moreover, the Privy Council in 1601 stayed
an action against Darcy in the Court of Common Pleas:
43. 30 ACrs OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL 1599-1600, at 443-44 (July 4, 1600).
44. See 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 345.
45. Cf 31 ACTs OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL 1600-1601, at 274 (April 10, 1601) ("her
Majestie to graunte unto John Spilman... priviledge for making of [writing] paper...
who in regard both of his extraordinary charge and trouble in first devising that arte in
England, and for many other considerations ....").
46. Hulme, History Sequel, supra note 25, at 53. See also 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
1, at 347 ("court favorites were rewarded by patents which enabled them to control the
manufacture of or the trade in the common necessaries of life") and 347 n.3 (listing
examples of such odious patents).
47. 31 Acrs OFTHE PRIVY COUNCIL 1600-1601 55-6 (December 23, 1600).
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A letter to the Lord Cheefe Justice of the Common Pleas ....
[A] cittizen of London, hath commenced a suite before you in the
Courte of Common Pleas wherin the valliditie of letters pattentes
granted unto [Darcy] by her Majestie concerninge playing cardes is
brought in question, wee are to let you understand her Majesty's
pleasure in that behalf that her Prerogative Royall may not be called
in question for the valliditie of the letters patentes, and therefore wee
praie you that you will take order that stay may be made of that
suite untill you shall understand further of her Majesty's pleasure
from us in that matter.48
Queen Elizabeth's "pleasure" was blatantly clear in these
declarations. Her issuance of a patent monopoly in the production
and sale of playing cards was a matter of royal prerogative and thus
was not to be checked or limited in any manner.
The nature of her monopoly patents, and the declarations and
warrants issuing from the Privy Council, fanned the flames of
discontent within Parliament. Elizabeth initially defended her royal
prerogative in issuing letters patent as "the chiefest flower in her
garden and principal and head pearl in her crown and diadem." 49 The
dispensation of a monopoly patent in playing cards to Edward Darcy
the following year (1598), among many others over the ensuing years,
did not do much to reassure Parliament that the Queen's "chiefest
flower" should continue to grow unabated. The result was that the
prerogative to issue such privileges was eventually circumscribed first
by the common law and later by an act of Parliament itself.
C. Legal Conflict: Prerogative vs. Common Law
The case of Darcy v. Allen-identified as The Case of
Monopolies in Coke's Reports5°-came directly on the heels of an
earlier compromise reached between Parliament and Queen
Elizabeth in 1601. The details and outcome of this case have been
48. 32 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL 1601-1604 237 (October 7, 1601) (emphasis
added). This action was begun by Turner, and thus was not the same suit that lead to the
famous decision in the King's Bench case of Darcy v. Allen.
49. Walterscheid, Part 2, supra note 24, at 865 (quoting SIR SIMONDS D'EwEs,
JOURNALS OF ALL THE PARLIAMENTS DURING THE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZABETH 547
(1682)).
50. 11 Co. Rep. 84 b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1603). The other three reports on this
case simply refer to it by its case name (although with variations in the spelling of the
parties' names), see 74 Eng. Rep. 1131; Noy 173, 72 Eng. Rep. 830; Moo. K. B. 919. The
significance of this case in Anglo-American case law cannot be understated; it continued
to be cited on both sides of the Atlantic up through the nineteenth century as definitive
precedent on issues concerning monopolies and the right to free trade. See The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,47-48 (1873).
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thoroughly dissected and discussed in previous historical treatments
of the subject, and thus I will not reiterate these well-known issues
here.51 My interest in this case is the role that it plays in the evolution
of patents away from being viewed as a monopoly grant under the
royal prerogative to being viewed as grant of legal rights to inventors.
This case is significant in this regard, because it lays the groundwork
for moving toward this new perspective-one that will eventually find
its fountainhead in the natural rights philosophy of John Locke.
Although Coke, in his role as Attorney General, argued on
behalf of Darcy's playing card monopoly before the Bench, his later
report on the case would state that the judges found "such [a] charter
of a monopoly, against the freedom of trade and traffic... against
divers Acts of Parliament .... [and] is a monopoly against the
common law."'52 His report bristles with condemnations of Darcy's
monopoly, claiming that "it is a dangerous innovation, as well without
any precedent, or example, as without authority of law, or reason,"53
that it "is utterly against law,"'54 and, in words that would reverberate
throughout the next two hundred years of patent law, that it is an
"odious monopoly."55 If one read only Coke's report of the case, one
would be inclined to believe that the Bench had declared that all
"monopolies are against the ancient and fundamentall laws of the
realm." 56
The pleadings and arguments, however, were in fact far more
complicated and not as dramatic in their conclusions as Coke
reports.57 This is indicated in Noy's report of the case, in which
defense counsel for Allen argued:
51. See, e.g., Jacob I. Corre, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen,
45 EMORY L.J. 1261 (1996); Walterscheid, History Sequel, supra note 24, at 867-69; Fox,
supra note 11, at 87-89.
52. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1265-66. Interestingly, Jacob Corre notes that at the trial the
judges "said that judgment should be entered against the plaintiff. And they did not
deliver any reason or cause for their judgment at this time." Corre, supra note 51, at 1267.
Corre discovered in Coke's unpublished notes on the case that the reasons were related to
him by one of the judges apart from the trial. Id. at 1269-71. This may explain why Coke's
report on the case is the only one that gives the reasons for the judgment beyond the
actual pleadings and arguments at trial.
53. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1264.
54. Id. at 1265.
55. Id. at 1266 (emphasis added).
56. 3 COKE, supra note 31, at 181 (analyzing the Statute of Monopolies).
57. Cf Corre, supra note 51, at 1296 ("It would be misleading to suggest that the
arguments advanced on behalf of and against Darcy's grants were founded on well-settled
and clearly applicable principles regarding the scope of royal prerogative.").
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Now therefore I will shew you how the Judges have heretofore
allowed of monopoly patents, which is, that where any man by his
own charge and industry, or by his own wit or invention doth bring
any new trade into the realm, or any engine tending to the
furtherance of a trade that never was used before: and that for the
good of the realm: that in such cases the King may grant to him a
monopoly patent for some reasonable time, until the subjects may
learn the same, in consideration of the good that he doth bring by
his invention to the commonwealth: otherwise not.58
Moore's report further indicates that great care was taken by defense
counsel to tread lightly in arguing against the royal prerogative
because, in the words of one barrister, "[h]e that hews above his head,
chips will fall into his eyes. '59 No one in Darcy v. Allen was out to
repudiate the Queen's royal prerogative in toto, but rather the judges
simply enunciated the first common-law rule for adjudicating the
legitimacy of a grant of monopoly privileges.
In this regard, it is notable that the arguments by Allen's
counselors reiterate the essential conditions laid down in the first
monopoly grant to Smyth and followed by Queen Elizabeth during
the first half of her reign. The argument by Allen's counsel quoted
above states that the crown may grant a patent "for a reasonable
time" to a man who "brings a new trade into the realm" by "his own
charge and industry" and through "his own wit or invention" "until
the subjects may learn" how to practice the trade themselves. What
then was the problem with Darcy's patent? In accordance with the
precedent of Matthey's case and the customary right to practice one's
trade, Allen's counsel argued that it "doth but take the trade of
making and selling of cards from many persons, and giveth that trade
to one, which is unlawful. '60  Thus, the first common-law
proclamation on monopolies simply reiterated the original conditions
governing the issuance of letters patent for inventions.61
If there was any doubt as to the holding of Darcy v. Allen, they
were alleviated by The Clothworkers of Ipswich Case in 1615.62 In
this case, a group of tailors incorporated and chartered by King James
to sell their services in Ipswich brought an action against an individual
tailor who was not part of the corporation but nonetheless practiced
his trade within the town. The case report reads:
58. 74 Eng. Rep. 1131,1139.
59. Moore at 672,72 Eng. Rep. 830,830
60. 74 Eng. Rep. at 1141.
61. See Klitzke, supra note 16, at 646.
62. Godbolt Rep. 252,78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B. 1615).
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[I]t was agreed by the Court, that the King might make
corporations... but thereby they cannot make a monopoly for that
is to take away free-trade, which is the birthright of every
subject.... But if a man hath brought in a new invention and a new
trade within the kingdom, in peril of his life, and consumption of his
estate or stock, &c. or if a man hath made a new discovery of any
thing, in such cases the King of his grace and favour, in recompence
of his costs and travail, may grant by charter unto him, that he only
shall use such a trade or trafique for a certain time, because at first
the people of the kingdom are ignorant, and have not the
knowledge or skill to use it: but when that patent is expired, the
King cannot make a new grant thereof: for when the trade is
become common, and others have been bound apprentices in the
same trade, there is no reason that such should be forbidden to use
it.63
This judgment lays out all of the doctrinal conditions for a valid grant
of a letter patent circa mid-sixteenth century: the justification for the
monopoly patent is introducing new industries into the realm, the
monopoly patent rewards the labor and costs of the inventor, the
patentee should train Englishmen in the practice of the trade, and
finally, no monopoly patent can issue for pre-existing industries.
Equally important is that the court still views patents as royal
privileges obtained through something akin to a contract between the
patentee and the crown, i.e., "the King of his grace and favour"
extends letters patent to inventors as a reward for their past labor and
for their future work to introduce a new industry to the realm.
Although the common-law courts had assumed the responsibility of
adjudicating disputes over patents for inventions,64 they were still
working within the initial conception of such devices-royal grants of
royal privileges for the achievement of royal policy goals.
D. Statute of Monopolies: A Step Toward a New Beginning
Although Darcy v. Allen declared a common-law limitation on
the use of letters patent, King James (1603-1625) continued to abuse
the royal prerogative in issuing letters patent for monopolies. Several
petitions from Parliament on this point eventually lead to King
James' publication of the Book of Bounty in 1610.65 Coke concluded
at the end of his report on The Case of Monopolies that James
63. Godbolt Rep. at 253-54,78 Eng. Rep. at 148.
64. This is, however, a bit of an overstatement. See infra note 125 and accompanying
text.
65. Fox, supra note 11, at 95-96.
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published the Book of Bounty "in zeal to the law and justice,"
wherein the king declared "that monopolies are things against the
laws of this realm; and therefore expressly commands, that no suitor
presume to move him to grant any of them, &c. '' 66 Moreover, Coke
claims in his Institutes that "[t]he judgement in the said case of
monopolies... was the principall motive of the publishing of the
kings [Book of Bounty]."67 On this point, Coke is very likely correct.
The Book of Bounty does list "[m]onopolies" under the heading of
"things contrary to our lawes. ' 68 Furthermore, King James declares
that he will continue to reward such things as "[p]rojects of new
invention, so they be not contrary to the Law, nor mischievous to the
State, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or
otherwise inconvenient. ' 69 In sum, the Book of Bounty contains the
essence of the judgment in The Case of Monopolies and thus it
appears to reflect the crown's willingness to refrain from abusing its
royal prerogative on this matter.
Despite King James' verbal commitment to limitations on the
royal power to grant monopolies, the de facto abuse of the royal
prerogative continued unabated. Parliament and the crown thus
came to loggerheads over monopoly patents again in the early 1620s,
but this time the king lacked the adroit political skills of his
predecessor.70 The result was that Parliament passed the Statute of
Monopolies in 1623, to which King James begrudgingly assented.71 In
his message to Parliament, King James noted his displeasure with the
statute:
Touching my Patents in general, I am grieved that you have
called them in and condemned them upon so short examination. I
confess I might have passed some upon false suggestion and wrong
information, but you are not to recall them before they be
examined by the judges.... Therefore I advise you to be careful,
that you have a good ground before you call for your patents, that
you do not defraud patentees.... I say to you when you judge of
66. 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1266 (K.B. 1603). Coke's report on The Case of Monopolies
was not published until 1615.
67. 3 COKE, supra note 31, at 182.
68. FOx, supra note 11, at 332 (quoting BOOK OF BOUNTY).
69. 1& at 334.
70. For an excellent survey of this third constitutional clash within the English
government (the first was the Parliament of 1601 and the second was the case of Darcy v.
Allen), see id. at 102-16.
71. I& at 115-16. Coke writes that the King James's prior publication of the Book of
Bounty "was a great motive of obtaining the royall assent to this act of parliament." 3
COKE, supra note 31, at 182.
patents, hear patiently, say not presently, it is against the law, for
patents are not to be judged unlawful by you. 72
King James' displeasure with this statute was not entirely unjustified.
Hulme's first article on patents in 1896 states that "the Statute of
Monopolies has been regarded as the first and final source of
authority" on the subject of patents.7 3  Thus, the Statute of
Monopolies represents the first definitive step toward the shift away
from royal prerogative and privileges to common law and legal rights.
From a constitutional perspective, the Statute of Monopolies
represents an incredible assertion of parliamentarian order and rule
by common law-as opposed to rule by royal prerogative. The
Statute limits all future monopoly patents to a term of fourteen
years.74 It also declares for the first time that all disputes concerning
monopoly patents will be tried at common law,75 and it provides for
treble damages and double costs for any person "hindred greeved or
disquieted... by occasion or pretext of any Monopolie. '76
Beyond these alterations to the existing practice of granting
monopoly patents, however, the Statute simply pronounces the
original doctrinal conditions that animated the grant to Henry Smyth
under the royal prerogative. 77 Section 6 of the Statute declares:
Provided alsoe and be it declared and enacted, That any
Declaracion before mencioned shall not extend to any tres Patente
and Graunte for the tearme of fowerteene yeares or under,
hereafter to be made of the sole working or makinge of any manner
of new Manufactures within this Realme, to the true and first
Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures, which others at the
tyme of makinge such tres Patente and Graunte shall not use, soe
as alsoe they be not contrary to the Laws nor mischievous to the
State, by raisinge prices of Comodities at home, or hurt of Trade, or
generallie inconvenient; the said fourteene yeares to be from the
72. Walterscheid, Part 2, supra note 24, at 873 (citing 1 COBBETr'S PARLIAMENTARY
HIsToRY OF ENGLAND 1503). King James was complaining that the Statute's preamble
voided all prior monopoly patents, excepting only a few specific patents listed in the
Statute's final sections, e.g., gunpowder and ordnance (§ 10), allum mines (§ 11), glass
making and importing calves skins (§ 13), and making smalts and melting iron ore (§ 14).
See An Act Concerning Monopolies, 21 Jac. I, c. 3 (1623) (Eng.).
73. Hulme, History, supra note 17, at 141.
74. 21 Jac. I, c. 3, § 6.
75. 21 Jac. I, c. 3, § 2. See also, 3 COKE, supra note 31, at 183. Although Queen
Elizabeth's compromise with Parliament in 1601 included her promise to allow monopoly
patents to be tried at common law, this agreement was never reduced to a statute or to an
official proclamation by Parliament.
76. 21 Jac. I, c. 3, § 4.
77. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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date of the first tres Patente or Grant of such priviledge hereafter
to be made... 78
Coke-the undisputed authority on the Statute of Monopolies-
would later write that section 6 laid down seven conditions for a valid
monopoly patent: (i) it must be for less than twenty-one years, (ii) "it
must be granted to the first and true inventor," (iii) it must be for
manufactures not in use at the time of the grant, (iv) it must not be
contrary to law, (v) it must not result in the raising of prices, (vi) it
must not hurt trade, and (vii) it must not be "generally
inconvenient. '79 Except for the time limitation, these conditions
express much of the function and purpose of the first monopoly
patents, i.e., the introduction of new industries and manufactures into
the realm. Even the added limitations, such as the prohibition against
price increases, are necessarily implied in a patent that should be
limited to only new manufactures, i.e., there could be no increase in
prices in the product when there were no products manufactured
before the grant.
It is in this regard that the Statute of Monopolies does not
represent a radical break with past policies, but merely lays down the
foundation for the eventual evolution of patent doctrine (and its
influence by natural rights theories).
E. Conclusion for Part One: The Early Era of Monopoly Patents
It is conceded that much of the preceding discussion constituted
an historical survey, but it was necessary to impress upon the reader
the extent to which patent doctrine evolved from its origins in early
royal grants of monopoly privileges. In sum, the patents issued for
inventions at the end of the eighteenth century, and adjudicated by
Lord Mansfield and Justice Buller in the law courts, are not the same
patents that were issued during the reign of Queen Elizabeth. In
order to understand this difference and how it came about, one must
first understand the nature of patent grants under Queen Elizabeth
and the subsequent passage of the Statute of Monopolies.
What was the nature of these early patent monopolies? They
were semi-contractual agreements between the crown and the
patentee: the patentee promised to introduce a new industry and to
help create a self-sufficient economy within the realm in exchange for
78. 21 Jac. I c. 3, § 6.
79. 3 COKE, supra note 31, at 184.
the crown's grant of a monopoly privilege for a term of years.80 In
essence, patents originally represented royal privileges issued under
the royal prerogative to achieve royal policy goals.
This is a ground that would not be receptive to the seeds of
thought planted by the natural rights philosophers. Yet there were
during these years hints of ideas that would come to fruition as the
intellectual climate changed over the ensuing two centuries. In 1559,
a naturalized, Italian-born subject, Jacobus Acontius, explicitly
invoked both rights and labor as a basis for granting patents to
inventors. In the first recorded statement of such an argument,
Acontius' letter to Queen Elizabeth declares:
Jacobus Acontius to the Queen. Nothing is more honest than that
those who, by searching, have found out things useful to the public
should have some fruits of their rights and labours, as meanwhile
they abandon all other modes of gain, are at much expense in
experiments, and often sustain much loss, as has happened to me. I
have discovered most useful things, new kinds of wheel machines,
and of furnaces for dyers and brewers, which when known, will be
used without my consent, except there be a penalty, and I, poor
with expenses and labour, shall have no returns. Therefore I beg a
prohibition against using any wheel machines, either for grinding or
bruising, or any furnaces like mine, without my consent.81
Of course, it would be more than a hundred years after this letter
before English subjects (and American colonists) learned that they
did not have to beg a monarch for protection of the "fruits of their
rights and labors." In the eighteenth century, John Locke's labor
theory of property would serve to justify the belief that patents reflect
a right to property that should be protected by the courts. By the
nineteenth century, the "odious monopoly" aspect of patents would
be gone-only property in inventions would remain.
Acontius' letter also suggests that the crown should reward those
inventors who labor and incur expenses in the creation of new
machines. There is circumstantial evidence that Acontius' view of
patents as rewards for past labor reached its mark. In a patent grant
in 1562 for the importation of more efficient foreign dredging
80. In King James's message to Parliament following the passage of the Statute of
Monopolies, he concedes that he "might have passed some upon false suggestion and
wrong information." See supra note 72 and accompanying text. In addition to the rule
enunciated in both Bircot's and Matthey's cases, another ground for voiding a patent in the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was that the patentee lied to the King, and thus
obtained the grant under false pretenses. This highlights the semi-contractual nature of
the early patent monopolies.
81. Fox, supra note 11, at 27 n.14 (emphasis added).
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machines, Queen Elizabeth notes that she hopes such a patent "will
give courage to others to study and seke for the knowledge of like
good engines and devyses."2 Moreover, Acontius himself eventually
prevailed and he was granted a patent for his machines in 1565, albeit
six years after his plea for protection.8 3
Over the ensuing years, the argument that patent monopolies
should be issued as a reward for past labor began to become more
commonplace among discussions of patents. This idea appears in The
Clothworkers of Ipswich Case in its discussion of the justification for
the issuance of letters patent for monopolies:
But if a man hath brought in a new invention and a new trade
within the kingdom, in peril of his life, and consumption of his estate
or stock, &c. or if a man hath made a new discovery of any thing, in
such cases the King of his grace and favour, in recompence of his
costs and travail, may grant by charter unto him .... 84
It also appears in Coke's discussion of the Statute of Monopolies, in
which he claims that a large part of the justification for grants to
inventors is that
the reason wherefore such a priviledge is good in law is, because
the inventor bringeth to and for the common wealth a new
manufacture by his invention, cost and charges, and therefore it is
reason, that he should have a priviledge for his reward.85
Although the talk is still in terms of privileges-royal privileges, to be
precise-such comments would prove fertile soil for the social
contract doctrines of the natural rights philosophers, and would thus
serve as the launching point for the evolution of patents as contracts
between inventors and society.
The first phase of the development of patents concludes with the
Statute of Monopolies because this statute represents the climax of
the crown's policy of granting patent monopolies.86 Never again will
crown and Parliament battle over patent monopolies-although the
82. Hulme, History, supra note 17, at 146.
83. Id at 148.
84. Godbolt Rep. 252, 253-54, 78 Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (emphasis added). Viner reports
that this case also held that "[a] patent for Greenland is good, because it was found at
great peril of the life of the first finder." 17 VINER, supra note 30, at 211. This argument
also relies on the premise that patents are rewards for risk and labor.
85. 3 COKE, supra note 31, at 184 (emphasis added).
86. See Thomas M. Meshbesher, The Role of History in Comparative Patent Law, 78 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 594, 595 (1996). "English patent practice did not grow
smoothly out of an English common law of patents but arose initially outside of the
English court system, and a very early legislative intervention was needed to keep this
practice from being drowned in an ocean of royal abuse." Id.
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resolution of the story will take another 150 years to complete. As I
indicated above, the Statute of Monopolies, with a few revisions,
simply codified the original function and purpose of granting letters
patent for monopoly privileges. During the subsequent years, patent
doctrine will enter a wild state of flux; new conditions will emerge, old
requirements will die and it will not be until the late eighteenth
century that a legal doctrine of patents for inventions will come into
its own. All the while, the ideas of John Locke and the other natural
rights philosophers will slowly assert their relevance to this process.
H. The Development of Modem Patent Doctrine
Despite the fundamental role that the Statute of Monopolies
plays in patent law, it would be more than a century after its passage
in 1623 that a coherent legal doctrine concerning patents would
develop. This is evidenced by the numerous complaints in the late
eighteenth century concerning the lack of precedent on this
increasingly important area of law. Lord Chief Justice Eyre would
lament in a significant case in 1795 that "[platent rights are nowhere,
that I can find, accurately discussed in our books."87  In a very
illuminating comment, Justice Eyre complains that Coke's Institutes
say "little or nothing of patent rights, as opposed to monopolies."88 In
another patent case of import ten years earlier, a solicitor remarks
that
the general questions of law on the subject [of patents] have never
been brought forward on any important trial [and] it may with truth
be said that the books are silent on the subject and furnish no clue
to go by, in agitating the question, "what is the law of patents?"8 9
Of course, the cases in which these complaints are voiced soon
became the precedents upon which the "law of patents" was created,
defined and applied by later courts. What explains the paucity of
common-law jurisprudence on patents, and how does this support the
thesis that natural rights philosophy influenced the development of
patent law doctrine in the late eighteenth century?
The cursory explanation for the lack of any common-law
jurisprudence on this subject between the Statute of Monopolies and
the late eighteenth century is straightforward: the Privy Council
refused to accede jurisdiction over patent grants of monopoly. In
87. Boulton & Watt v. Bull, 1 Carp. P.C. 117,145,126 Eng. Rep. 651, 665 (C.P. 1795).
88. Boulton & Watt, 1 Carp. P.C. at 145,126 Eng. Rep. at 665 (emphasis added).
89. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 61 (quoting a statement by Abraham Weston, solicitor
for James Watt in 1785).
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1626, shortly after passage of the Statute of Monopolies, the Privy
Council cut short litigation over a disputed patent monopoly,
proclaiming:
The Lords declare that the patent shall stand.... They think it of
dangerous consequence and far trenching upon the prerogative that
patents granted on just grounds and of long continuance should be
referred to the strict trial of common law, wherefore they order that
all proceedings at law be stayed.90
The Privy Council's obstinate refusal to concede jurisdiction reflected
the more fundamental issue that patents were still conceived as a
royal prerogative. Despite the earlier constitutional battles over the
use of the prerogative to grant monopoly patents, the framing of this
issue in terms of royal monopoly privileges was never challenged.
The resulting implication was that patent monopolies should be
adjudicated by the prerogative courts, which is exactly what the Privy
Council was asserting in 1626, despite the injunction of the Statute of
Monopolies to the contrary. Until the adjudication of patents shifts
to common-law judges, learned men steeped in the traditional rights
of Englishmen and the doctrine of natural rights, patents would
remain wedded to the royal prerogative. 91
Given the Privy Council's reassertion of the royal prerogative
shortly after the passage of the Statute of Monopolies, it continued to
adjudicate disputes over patent grants throughout the seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries. The Statute of Monopolies was not
dead; only its jurisdictional section remained unenforced. What the
ensuing years reflect is the obstinacy of the old concept of patents-
and the slow evolution and willy-nilly appearance of new conditions
and requirements. This state of chaos in patent grants-whether
conceived of as monopolies or as inventions-constitutes an
evolutionary period in the doctrine of patents. It is this gradual
evolution between the passage of the Statute of Monopolies in 1626
and the mid-eighteenth century that creates the conditions necessary
for the reception of natural rights ideas and their promulgation by
common-law judges in the late eighteenth century.
Sometime in the late 1670s, for instance, an inventor, Yarranton,
would challenge the earlier issuance of a patent for the "plateing of
90. Walterscheid, Part 3, supra note 12, at 774 (quoting State Papers, Domestic (1626))
(emphasis added). Notably, the Privy Council had, only six months earlier, conceded that
it was "agreeable to the late statute of monopolies" and permitted the litigation to go
forward. Id.
91. The concept of patents for inventors would remain wedded to the royal
prerogative for the next 150 years. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
steele, iron, brasse and copper and of the tynning of the same
plates." 92 Yarranton's petition to the Council asks:
Whether this patent for making tinn plates is in force, the
patentee having made none since the granting thereof?. And whether
this patent be in force if renewed since tin plates were made by
others?
And so I may make queryes of most patents... because the
statute that gives the king power to grant patents for fourteen years
limited it wholly to a new invention; for it must not be putting a
new piece unto an old cap that must serve turn..., but the
question with us will be whether it be new, and all and every part of
the invention new in this nation? and if so, questionless it is within
the meaning of the statute.93
Although the records are unclear as to whether Yarranton's challenge
was successful or not, his petition is significant regardless of the
outcome. The reason is that his petition reflects old patent monopoly
doctrine: he first asks whether the patent is still valid since the
patentees had not worked it since their grant many years earlier, and
he then asks if the grant is valid given similar work by other people
within the realm. The former explicitly refers to the early
requirement that the patentee must work the patent in order to
maintain its validity, and the latter explicitly refers to Bircot's case.9 4
Yet the fact that Yarranton spends much of his petition focusing upon
the "first inventor" requirement of the Statute portends the future
requirement that a patented invention be novel 95
The dispute over Garills application for a patent foretells the
future development of the requirement of a specification for a valid
patent grant. In 1663, Garill applied for a patent "for the sole casting
92. E. Wyndham Hulme, On the History of Patent Law in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries, 18 L.Q.R. 280,281-82 (1902) [hereinafter Hulme, Patent Law] (citing
Patent Roll, 13 Car. 2). This patent grant reflects the conditions imposed by the Statute of
Monopolies, stating that the patentees' invention "being their own invention and never
before done or used in these our kingdomes ... have humbly besought us for their better
encouragement to exercise and put in practise the said invention, that we would be
graciously pleased to grant them our letters patent of privilege for the sole use and benefit
thereof for the time and term of fourteen years ...." Id.
93. Id. at282.
94. Yarranton even paraphrases Coke's phrase, "to put but a new button to an old
coat," 3 CoKE, supra note 31, at 184, with his own comment, "putting a new piece unto an
old cap."
95. See infra notes 209-27 and accompanying text.
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of gold and silver Ingots for Lace, after his new Invention. ' '96 His
petition was challenged by the Officers of the Mint and the
Goldsmiths and Wiredrawers of London, who contended that "[i]t
not appearing what his Invention is, he may apply it to any way that
any wyre drawer shall hereafter practise, And by that way ingrosse
the whole trade of Wyre-drawing, wch will be hurtful to trade, and
deprive many hundreds of their Labour and lyvelyhood.' 97  The
challenge to Garill's patent petition is straight out of section 6 of the
Statute of Monopolies, alleging that his patent is essentially not new,
hurts the industry and will violate the right to free trade. What was
new was that the King responded to the challenge by ordering the
Privy Council to obtain a disclosure from Garill of his new method for
casting precious metals as wire.98 The reasoning was that such a
disclosure would either prove or disprove the contentions by the
Officers of the Mint and the Goldsmiths and Wiredrawers of London.
Garill refused to disclose his invention to the Privy Council, and the
proceedings were thus concluded. Garill did not obtain a patent, and
Hulme writes that "the secret died with the inventor." 99  The
significance of the hotly contested battle over Garill's petition for a
patent is that it was the first time the Council demanded a
specification of the patentee's invention as a precondition for the
issuance of the patent. Again, new patent doctrine conditions were
evolving out of the old policy of patent monopolies granted under the
royal prerogative.
Despite these small steps forward, additional patent grants and
disputes during the latter decades of the seventeenth century
centered on elements of the old conception of patent monopolies. On
May 12, 1679, the King voided a patent grant for "smelting malleable
lead and other metals with coals" because, according to Hulme,
"during the first ten years of his grant the patentee had 'made no
manner of use of it."'100 In 1693, a patent for the manufacture of pitch
and tar, originally granted in 1685, was voided because the patentee
96. E. Wyndham Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent for
Invention from the Restoration to 1794 [Part I], 33 L.Q.R. 63, 66 (1917), [hereinafter
Hulme, Privy Council] (quoting Considerations of Lawe upon the Patent of John Garill,
Wyre Drawer, for the sole casing to gold and silver Ingots for Lace, after his new
invention, a petition filed by Garill with the King on July 1,1664).
97. id. at 67.
98. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 42.
99. Hulme, Privy Council, supra note 96, at 65.
100. Id at 71.
was not working the patent and had in fact returned to his native
France.101
During the same period, however, there are also numerous cases
that reflect a growing momentum toward the development of a patent
doctrine for inventors (in the modern sense of the term), i.e., those
people who create novel machines or procedures. In 1669, the
Company of Painter Stainers of London petitioned the King to void a
1667 patent grant to Howard and Watson for the engraving,
varnishing and painting of ships; the King affirmed the original grant,
noting that their invention was a "new manufacture, and the
patentees the true and first inventors thereof, and that it was
profitable to the Kingdom, and that the privilege granted was a just
and legal privilege fit to be cherished and preserved."'1 2 The reason
for the King's reaffirmation of the original patent? Howard and
Watson had in fact invented a new process using English materials,
whereas the petitioners imported materials and used a process from
abroad. This is one of the first hints at the patent grant being
extended to a true inventor against an importer of the same
manufacture. With different effect, the requirement of some nascent
notion of novelty was invoked in 1673, when the Company of
Perruque-makers successfully challenged a patent grant for the
bleaching and curling of hair. Hulme writes that they proved that
"the process was not invented by the petitioners."'10 3 In 1689, the
Privy Council voided a patent for "napping, i.e., raising the nap, of
cloth by an engine, &c." following a challenge by two subjects who
contended that they were in fact the true inventors. 104
A 1686 patent for the manufacture of imitation marble was
voided in 1689 when two challengers "proved that the invention was
found out and used.., a long time before the passing of this
patent."' 05  In 1687, the King refused to grant a patent for a
"repeating mechanism for clocks and watches" after the
Clockmakers' Company proved that this mechanism was already
being constructed at the time of the patent petition.10 6 A patent
101. E. Wyndham Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent for
Invention from the Restoration to 1794 [Part 111, 33 L.Q.R. 180,181-82 (1917) [hereinafter
Hulme, Privy Council Part II].
102. Hulme, Privy Council, supra note 96, at 68.
103. Id. at 69.
104. Id. at 74-75. However, the challengers later had their grant withheld due to a
successful challenge by "some Englishmen interested in [the] patent." Id-
105. Hulme, Privy Council Part II, supra note 101, at 182.
106. Id. at 182.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
August 2001] RETHINKING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENTS 1281
granted in 1702 for a metallurgical process was voided in 1706 on the
grounds that it was substantially similar to an earlier patent grant-
the determination being that the second patent did not go to the first
inventor. 07 Finally, a 1719 case revealed the growing importance of
the implicit concept of novelty when the Company of Silk Throwsters
was unsuccessful in their petition to revoke a patent for "spinning
organzine silk" because the Company was "not able to prove that any
of the three sorts of engines used by the [patentee] were ever before
made or used in the kingdom.' 10 8
However, Lord Coke's condemnation of "odious monopolies" is
still a dominant line of thought at this time concerning any letters
patent grant for manufacture or trade. As Coke declared:
"Generally all monopolies are against magna charta, because they are
against the liberty and freedom of the subject and the law of the
land."'109  Such words would continue to resonate throughout
discussions of patent grants." 0 In a 1648 dispute over a grant by letter
patent of a trade monopoly to The East India Company, Lord Chief
Justice Jefferies notes the truism of the time that "Monopoly, or
Engrossing, generally spoken of is odious in the eye of the law.""'
Yet this case also reveals the difficulties that judges and royal
councilors were beginning to have with Coke's general
condemnation; Lord Jefferies later qualifies his initial claim when he
states that "though monopolies are forbidden, yet that cannot be
understood to be so universally true, (as no general law can ever be)
that it should in no respect, and upon no occasion or emergency
whatsoever, admit of any exception or limitation."1 2 The justices
concluded that the monopoly grant to The East India Company was
valid.
This case also represents the first time in the context of patent
monopolies that a natural rights philosopher is used in legal
arguments by both a party to the dispute and by the judge in his
decision. The East India Company defended itself, in part, by
claiming that it "hath been in possession of this trade near one
107. Id. at 184.
108. Id. at 186.
109. 17 VINER, supra note 30, at 206.
110. "Monopolies are odious." Id. at 207 (citing the case of Company of Stationers, 10
Mod. 106,107 Mich. 11 Ann.).
111. The East India Co. v. Sandys (The Great Case of Monopolies), 10 St. Tr. 371, 538
(1683). For an abridged (and modernized) version of this case report, see FOX, supra note
11, at 353-67.
112. The East India Co., 10 St. Tr. at 538.
hundred years, and that possession will in time give a right,""n 3 citing
Hugo Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis.114 Lord Jefferies agreed with
the Company that its monopoly patent was valid, but did so without
saying that the Company had a natural right to its trade monopoly.
He agreed, rather, on the ground acknowledged by Grotius himself
that "not every kind of monopoly.., amounts to a direct violation of
the laws of nature,""15 and cited with approval to Grotius' own
examples of trading monopolies established in the classical age that
were, according to Grotius, entirely just and appropriate." 6
Although the East India Company case did not pertain to a
monopoly patent for invention, the discussion of Grotius in this 1648
case is momentous in the development of patents. First, it evidences
that the courts considered the natural rights philosophers as reputable
authorities on the topics of monopolies and patent grants by a
sovereign." 7 Second, it indicates that Grotius' theories would not
provide the theoretical underpinnings for eighteenth-century
arguments concerning a property right in an invention. This is chiefly
due to the fact that Grotius' theory of property necessarily requires
use and occupation as the standard for a moral claim to possession,
and thus his theory of property is limited to pre-existing tangible
goods." 8 Note that occupation is the exact sense of the East India
113. Id. at 518. The East India Company is relying on Grotius' argument that original
occupancy is the source of a right to property, see HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC
PAciS Bk. II, Ch. 2, § ii (1625) [hereinafter GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI]. However, this
claim contradicts Grotius' belief that the sea, such as a trade route on the sea, cannot be
owned in such a manner and that such a thing is "impossible to be reduced to a state of
property." Id. at Bk. II, Ch. 2, § iii. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
114. This title is often translated as "The Law of War and Peace," but it is translated
alternatively as "The Rights of War and Peace." The English edition that I am using is:
HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A.C. Campbell trans., 1903) (1625).
115. The East India Co., 10 St. Tr. at 539. The reference to natural law here seems to be
something like a natural right to free trade. Grotius writes elsewhere that "owners have
not the same right in the sale of their goods, for others are at full liberty to determine
whether they will purchase certain articles or not." GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI, supra note
113, at Bk. II, Ch. 2, § xx, at 100.
116. The East India Co., 10 St. Tr. at 539. Grotius refers to the "just reasons for
granting monopolies, and that too at a settled price: a noble instance of which we find in
the history of Joseph, who governed Egypt under the auspices of Pharaoh. So also under
the Roman government the people of Alexandria, as we are informed by Strabo, enjoyed
the monopoly of all Indian and Ethiopian goods." GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI, supra note
113, at Bk. II, Ch. 12, § xvi.
117. See also JOHN DYER COLLIER, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW
INVENTIONS 2-3 (1803) (mentioning how the "learned Grotius has examined the
question" of monopolies, but questioning his defense of them).
118. See supra note 113. Grotius writes that "it very soon became apparent, in regard
to articles ... (for example, food and drink), that a certain form of private ownership was
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Company's claim for why they have a natural right to the trade route,
i.e., they have monopolized and used it for 100 years. Also, Grotius'
views on this subject support the early royal policy of granting
monopoly privileges, rather than the later legal doctrine of protecting
inventions. 119
The same must be said about Samuel Pufendorf's position on
monopoly grants. In his famous 1672 treatise, De Jure Naturae et
Gentium, Pufendorf begins a discussion of monopolies by asking:
"Monopolies, Whether any, or all of them be against the Law of
Nature, or no? For 'tis an odious Name, and the Laws of many States
brand it grievously."1 20 It is doubtful that Pufendorf read either
Coke's report on Darcy v. Allen or his Institutes, and thus the
congruent use of "odious" to refer to monopolies is quite remarkable.
Moreover, Pufendorf's argument against monopolies is similar to
Coke's; Pufendorf maintains that "hindering some by force.., and by
that means lay a Necessity upon all others to buy of him, it is plain
that he offends against the Law of Humanity, and impudently breaks
in upon the Liberty of the rest.' 121 In sum, monopolies are odious
because they violate the natural law and the natural liberty of those
subjugated to the monopolist's whims.
Yet monopolies are not universally condemned by Pufendorf.
He writes that "the Magistrate may give one Man, or one
Company... the sole Power of Importing certain Commodities from
certain Places, exclusive of all others. And there may be severael [sic]
good reasons for the granting such a Priviledge."'122 The conditions
that justify government monopoly grants are: (i) guaranteeing that
inseparable from use." STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF
PROPERTY 13 (1991) (citing HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUs 228
(G.L. Williams trans., 1950) (unpublished manuscript discovered in 1864)). Grotius also
argues that "just as the right to use was originally acquired through a physical act of
attachment... so it was deemed desirable that each individual's private possessions
should be acquired, as such, through similar acts of attachment." RICHARD TUCK,
NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES 61 (1979) (citing GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE
COMMENTARIUS, supra, at 229).
119. Grotius writes that monopolies can be legitimate, but "all combinations to raise
the necessary articles of life to an exorbitant rate, or all violent and fraudulent attempts to
prevent the market from being supplied, or to buy up certain commodities, in order to
enhance the price, are public injuries and punishable as such." GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI,
supra note 113, at Bk. II, Ch. 12, § xvi, at 152.
120. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS 27 (Basil
Kenner trans., 1703) (1672) (emphasis on "odious" added). Pufendorf s discussion of
monopolies can be found in Bk. 5, Ch. 5, § 7.
121. 1&
122 IL at 28.
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companies may recover great expenses incurred in establishing
remote trade routes and (ii) a monopolist may better help the country
in times of emergency.1 23
As with Grotius, Pufendorf's political philosophy better justifies
the past royal policies of granting patent monopolies than the modem
legal doctrine of patents for inventions. Pufendorf believes that
monopolies violate natural law and natural rights because he views
monopolies in terms of coercion and the violation of the natural
liberty to contract and to freely trade. This conclusion is most likely
the result of his failure to articulate an account of property rights
independent of his social contract theory. 2 4 In this respect, he never
explicitly describes the mechanism by which an individual claims
ownership in a particular object in the world. This is important
because invention is an individual act of creation-of individual
labor-and thus the moral and political theory that would eventually
justify patents for inventions must both explain and legitimize this act
of individual creation.
My discussion of Grotius and Pufendorf explains why natural
rights arguments for a property right to an invention, or even for a
social contract interpretation of patent grants, would not come about
until the eighteenth century-after John Locke publishes his own
theories on the social contract and on labor as the source of property.
Surprisingly, Locke never specifically addresses the subject of patent
monopolies in any of his published philosophical tracts or political
writings. Nonetheless, of all the natural rights philosophers, it is his
theories that ultimately provide the substantive justification for
creating a patent doctrine for inventors-not monopolists.
Until this could occur, however, a final institutional element of
the old patent doctrine had to be removed from the enforcement of
patents: the Privy Council's jurisdiction over patent disputes. The
Privy Council refused to acquiesce jurisdiction over patents to the
common-law courts, despite the injunction of the Statute of
Monopolies to the contrary.1l 5 Holdsworth writes:
123. Id.
124. See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, On the Law of Nature and of Nations, in THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF-SAMUEL PUFENDORF 93, 175-86 (Craig L. Carr ed., Michael J.
Seidler trans., 1994) (discussing the origin of dominion).
125. There are some examples of the Privy Council referring parties to the common-law
courts for additional litigation, but there are no court records indicating that any further
legal actions were taken. See Hulme, Privy Council, supra note 96, at 72-73. One theory
might be that the parties settled out of court, or alternatively, that the parties were
accustomed to the Privy Council adjudicating patent disputes and thus took such
directions as defacto dismissals.
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All through this period, cases which involved the making, the
regulation, and the revocation of these patents, generally came
before the [Privy] Council. The Council decided such questions as,
Who of two claimants was the first inventor, Whether a patentee
was working his patent, Whether the invention was really new,
Whether it was in the public interest to grant a patent.126
The questions that Holdsworth lists as guiding the Council's
deliberations on this subject follow the Statute of Monopolies, but the
conditions of "first inventor" and of a "new" invention were slowly
increasing in importance and changing in meaning, whereas public
utility was slowly decreasing in significance. In sum, patent grants
were slowly evolving, but it would not be a uniform or complete
evolution until the Privy Council completely relinquished jurisdiction.
When that occurred, the doctrine would finally change in toto from
royal industrial policy to inventor's legal right.
The watershed moment for the Privy Council's jurisdiction over
patents began with the issuance of a patent to Dr. James in 1747 for
his invention of a fever powder.127 In 1752, Walker Baker, a chemist,
challenged the validity of Dr. James' patent; he claimed that Dr.
James was not the inventor. The Privy Council rejected Baker's
petition, and Hulme summarized its report as follows:
[U]pon perusing the Letters Patent granted to Dr. James and also
the specification of his medicine inrolled in Chancery, they found
that the new invention, [to] which the said Letters Patent relate, is
compounded of a powder and in pill, whereas the Petition and
Affidavits laid before them in support of it, concern the Powder
which is one of the ingredients, only, so that supposing what the
Petitioner says to be true, it is quite immaterial and don't effect
[sic] the medicine.., therefore they are humbly of opinion that the
said Petition [by Baker] is not pertinent and ought to be
dismissed. 128
Baker, however, would not be let down so easily; he subsequently
brought an action early in 1753 against Dr. James in the law courts,
accusing him of perjury. Baker then petitioned the Privy Council to
order its clerk, William Sharpe, Esq., to testify at trial as to the
affidavit filed by Dr. James in support of his letter patent.129 The
126. 6 HOLDSwORTH, supra note 1, at 331.
127. See Hulme, Privy Council Part II, supra note 101, at 189.
128. Id at 189-90.
129. Id. at 190 (In his letter to the Privy Council, Baker "humbly prays His Majesty in
Council will be most graciously pleased to Order the said Clerk of the Council to attend
the said Trial at the Petitioner's expense and to produce the said original Affidavit
thereupon.").
Privy Council balked at this request, replying that "we are humbly of
opinion that it is not a matter which the Petitioner can demand in
point of strict legal right.' 30 Baker's efforts at voiding Dr. James'
patent were thus effectively thwarted and the patent remained in
force.
With respect to this dispute, Hulme reports that "in 1753 Lord
Mansfield [apparently] formed an unfavourable opinion of the
validity of James's patent.' 131 More than twenty years later, Lord
Mansfield would in fact refer to Dr. James' specification as an
example of a specification lacking in merit.132 Thus, Baker would
have very likely prevailed if his action at law had continued.
Baker's challenge to the validity of Dr. James' patent thus came
to represent the final conflict between the Privy Council and the law
courts concerning patents. Although both institutions considered Dr.
James' specification to be the reference point for determining the
validity of his patent, they came to decidedly separate conclusions as
to the legal effect of the specification. Hulme writes:
We are probably justified, therefore, in assuming that the quarrel
between the Council and Lord Mansfield led to a reconsideration,
from a constitutional standpoint, of the Council's jurisdiction, and
that as a result the Council decided, under the advice of the Law
Officers, to divest itself of its functions. 33
In 1753, the Privy Council relinquished to the law courts jurisdiction
over determining the validity of patents for inventions; thus putting
into effect, albeit 130 years late, section 2 of the Statute ofMonopolies.134
The dispute over Dr. James' patent between 1752-1753 is
important for two reasons. First, patents thereafter would be
adjudicated solely by the law courts, as opposed to the prerogative
130. Id. at 191.
131. Id. at 194.
132. "But if, as Dr. James did with his powders, the specification of the composition
gives no proportions, there is an end of his patent." Hulme, Patent Law, supra note 92, at
285 (quoting Lord Mansfield's jury instructions in Liardet v. Johnson (1778)). There is a
slightly different version of this statement provided by Buller's notes on Mansfield's jury
instructions in Liardet v. Johnson: "Dr. James's patent [was] void for want of proportions,
though the ingredients [were] specified." 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD
MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 756
(1992).
133. Hulme, Privy Council Part II, supra note 101, at 194.
134. "That all Monopolies and all such Comissions Graunte Licences Charters tres
patente... the force and validitie of them and every of them ought to be, and shalbe for
ever hereafter.., tried and detmined by and accordinge to the Comon Lawes of this
Realme & not otherwise." 21 Jac. I, c. 3. §. 2. See also 3 COKE, supra note 31, at 183.
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courts. This is not, strictly speaking, a shift in particular doctrinal
conditions for patents inasmuch as it simply constitutes a shift in
jurisdiction between two courts of the realm. Early patent doctrine
evolved out of the royal prerogative serving royal industrial policies
and as long as the adjudication of the validity of letters patent for
monopolies was left to the Privy Council, this perception of patent
grants would permeate their issuance and enforcement. Even when
the Privy Council hinted at things to come, such as its affirmation of a
patent grant in 1669 to the first inventor, the Council would still speak
in terms of the royal prerogative, i.e., declaring that "the privilege
granted was a just and legal privilege.' 135 When a patent grant was
disputed at the Privy Council, it was not the right of the inventor that
was at stake, but rather the royal power to confer privileges upon its
subjects. When the petitioners lost their challenge in 1669, for
instance, the king warned them to "presume not to... do anything
which might violate, or infringe the privilege.'136 It was not a right,
legal or natural, but rather a royal privilege that was violated by
patent infringers. This perspective could only change if the law
courts-with their judges steeped in the customary rights of
Englishmen and in the theories of the natural rights philosophers-
took over the responsibility for enforcing, and thus defining, valid
patent grants.
Second, the dispute in Dr. James' case focused upon the validity
of his specification in his original petition for a patent. Even the Privy
Council reviewed Dr. James' specification when Baker filed his
petition to void the grant.137 Although it would be another twenty-
five years before the specification would be officially enshrined by the
law courts as a requirement for a valid patent, 38 the fact that it was a
dispute over a specification that ultimately led the Privy Council to
concede jurisdiction to the law courts is telling. This case
foreshadows the central place that the specification will take in patent
law doctrine, and also highlights its development up to this point.
135. Hulme, Privy Council, supra note 96, at 68.
136. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 59 (emphasis added). Moreover, the crown continued
to engage in some abuse of the patent grants, issuing patents in palpable violation of the
Statute of Monopolies; this was particularly the case in grants of patent monopolies in the
colonies. See id. at 28. This is arguably a logical result of the continuing perspective of
patent monopolies as grants conferring royal privileges.
137. In "perusing the Letters Patent granted to Dr. James, and also the specification of
his medicine inrolled in Chancery." See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 132.
1287
The specification was unheard of as a requirement for a patent
grant prior to the late seventeenth century, i.e., Garill's patent
petition. This is hardly surprising; patent monopolies were granted to
promote industrial development and a self-sufficient economy, not to
protect an inventor's product upon, which he labored for years. A
specification, in essence a disclosure by the inventor of the process or
machine that he has alone created, would have been, and was in fact,
moot in the early years of patent grants of monopolies. 139 Yet when
patent grants-under the Statute of Monopolies' injunction that only
the "true and first inventor" should be awarded a patent-became a
tool for true inventors (and original importers) then the specification
moved into the forefront of patent doctrine. Why? It is my thesis
that the disclosure of the patentee's invention came to be viewed as a
form of a social contract within the framework of Locke's political
philosophy. The consideration for the grant was no longer the
importation of industry, but rather the inventor's disclosure of his
new creation, which he offered to society in exchange for a limited
monopoly in which he could fully exploit his innovation.
The development of the novelty requirement in modem patent
doctrine constitutes the second element of the shift away from the
early patent doctrine. Hulme writes that in the eighteenth century,
"the novelty of the invention was subjected to a new and more
searching test."'140  Although Hulme believes that the original
requirement of introduction of a new industry, expressed in Matthey's
and Bircot's cases, represented an early version of the novelty
requirement,141 I would contend that this early requirement was an
entirely different beast. Bircot's and Matthey's cases held that patent
monopoly grants could only be issued for entirely new industries or
trades given the English subject's right to free trade and his right to
work in his chosen profession. If the industry had once existed in the
realm, but did not at the time of the grant, then the patent monopoly
would be valid because it was re-introducing the trade to the realm
and thus advancing England's overall industrial and economic
development. 42 This reflects an entirely different purpose than the
eighteenth-century requirement of novelty, i.e., that the patented
invention be entirely new and novel. Following the judicial adoption
of the novelty requirement in the eighteenth century, if any prior use
139. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
140. Hulme, Patent Grant, supra note 32, at 318.
141. Hulme, History, supra note 17, at 153.
142. Klitzke, supra note 16, at 638.
1288 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
August 2001] RETHINKING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENTS 1289
of the patented invention was discovered, then the patent was void on
its face.143 Thus, the modem legal requirement of novelty reflects
none of the concerns of the earlier condition placed on the royal
privilege. The earlier letters patent cases did not even use the term
"novelty" when discussing the requirements of Bircot's or Matthey's
cases. It is my thesis that this change in requirements arose, in part,
because Locke's labor theory of value provided a moral framework
with which to protect the inventor's labors. Once this became the
central focus of patents, an inventor's creation had to be novel or it
would fail to comply with the underlying moral premise of a patent
grant.
A. Specification: Proof of Original Invention and Social Contract
"Neither specification nor written disclosure," writes Klitzke,
"was required in the vast majority of the Elizabethan grants."'144 This
follows logically from the purpose and function of the original letters
patent grants of monopoly privileges. If importation or re-
establishment of domestic industry was the goal of the royal grants of
monopoly privileges, then the consideration offered for this privilege
was the patentee's promise to work the industry and to train English
apprentices. This is in fact explicitly stated in both Darcy v. Allen and
The Clothworkers of Ipswich Case. For instance, Allen's counsel
argued in Darcy v. Allen that
where any man by his own charge and industry... doth bring any
new trade into the realm... the King may grant to him a monopoly
patent for some reasonable time, until the subjects may learn the
same, in consideration of the good that he doth bring by his
invention to the commonwealth. 145
As the reader may recall from Part One, there was no need or
concern about disclosure of the inventions. In early patent grants, the
fundamental concern was only furthering the royal economic policy
that the realm progress in its industries and trades.
MacLeod confirms this fact in her acknowledgment that the
"[s]pecification-the enrolment of a separate, more detailed
description of the invention within a certain time of the patent's
issue-was at first exceptional.' 1 46  Within the extant historical
record, the first two specifications were voluntarily provided by true
143. Id.
144. Id at 641-42.
145. Darcy v. Allin, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1139 (emphasis added). See generally supra Part
One.
146. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 48-49.
inventors, i.e., discoverers of a new process rather than a mere
importer of a trade or process from abroad. The first was Sturtevant,
who applied for a patent in 1611 for, in Hulme's words, "certain
inventions in connexion with the application of coal for smelting iron,
and generally for the application of coal as fuel in industries in which
wood was the solely employed."'147 With his petition, Sturtevant also
filed a "treatise of Metallica" in which he specified some of the
processes of his invention and further promised to deliver a complete
treatise upon securing his patent grant. His reasoning for filing the
treatise along with his patent application was to illustrate that:
1. his inventions were new, were not stolen, and were his own;
2. precisely what were his inventions so as not to hinder other men
in their trades or inventive activities;
3. no one after this will gain a patent for the inventions listed
therein; and
4. this disclosure pre-empts any requirement for working the patent
as a condition for its validity.148
Sturtevant proved quite prescient with his application because these
four reasons reflect the later justification for the requirement of a
specification. Of particular interest is his first condition and his
fourth condition: the specification proves he is the inventor and the
specification removes the necessity of having to work the patent.
These two functions naturally complement each other. Thus the first
steps were taken toward protecting true inventors who contracted for
a patent monopoly in exchange for disclosure of their invention; in
other words, Sturtevant foresaw modem patent doctrine.
It would be exactly 100 years before the next filing of a
specification in an application for a patent for invention. 149 (The
reader may recall that Garill refused to comply with the request for a
specification, and thus his patent application was rejected.) In 1711,
147. Hulme, Patent Grant, supra note 32, at 315.
148. Id. at 316. Klitzke also lists these four conditions in his article on patent grants,
citing Hulme's article, but he rewords the fourth condition so that it incorrectly states that
the disclosure merely requires Sturtevant to provide a complete disclosure once he is
granted the patent. This is incorrect and it misses the point that the specification is
intended to replace the condition of working the patent, which is something that
Sturtevant undoubtedly understood himself. See Klitzke, supra note 16, at 642.
149. Walterscheid discusses several monopoly grants in the seventeenth century that
included within the letter patent a written description of the invention, but none of these
constitute separate filings of a description of the invention, i.e., a specification. See
Walterscheid, Part 3, supra note 12, at 783-85.
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Queen Anne granted a patent to John Nasmith, in which his patent
grant states:
Anne, &c., Whereas John Nasmith of Hamelton in North Britain,
apothecary, has by his petition represented to us that he has at
great expense found out a new Invention for preparing and
fermenting wash from sugar "Molosses" and all sorts of grain to be
distilled which will greatly increase our revenues when put in
practice which he alleges he is ready to do "but that he thinks it not
safe to mencon in what the New Invention consists untill he shall
have obtained our Letters Patents for the same. But has proposed
to ascertain the same in writeing under his hand and seale to be
Inrolled in our high Court of Chancery within a reasonable time
after the passing of these our Letters Patents," &c.150
Nasmith feared that others would steal his invention-his "new
invention for preparing and fermenting wash from sugar"-if he
disclosed it prior to the issuance of the letters patent, and thus he
promised to file an appropriate description thereof once he was
accorded the protection of the crown. Following in Sturtevant's
footsteps, Nasmith sought to file a specification in order to ensure
that it was his invention, that it was a new invention, and that he
would have the proper protection for his work.
Subsequent to Nasmith's patent, the filing of a specification in
addition to the patentee's application for a grant became more
commonplace. On average, twenty percent of filings between 1711-
1734 included specifications and they became a routine part of the
patent system after 1734.151 The reader may recall that the central
contention over Dr. James' patent in 1752 was whether his
specification properly disclosed the novel aspects of his patented
invention. 152
Although Lord Mansfield was not afforded the opportunity to
lambaste Dr. James' specification in 1752, he was able to enshrine in
the law his own views on the specification in Liardet v. Johnson
(1778).153 In this case, Liardet filed suit against Johnson, alleging
infringement of Liardet's patent for a certain composition of cement
150. Hulme, Patent Grant, supra note 32, at 316 (quoting Patent Roll, 10 Ann., Part 2).
151. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 49.
152. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
153. With respect to the overall legal dispute, there are interesting facts and various
procedural issues involving both the original patent, assignment of the patent, re-
assignment of the patent back to the original patentee, and the existence of two trials,
which are all summarized nicely by Walterscheid, Part 3, supra note 12, at 793-96. See also
John N. Adams & Gwen Averley, The Patent Specification: The Role of Liardet v
Johnson, 7 J. LEGAL HIST. 158,162-67 (1986).
(similar to stucco). Johnson defended himself by attacking both the
validity of the specification and the novelty of the invention itself.
The February 23, 1778, edition of the Morning Post's report on the
trial concluded: "The legality and justness of the patent and
specification being also proved to the satisfaction of the jury, a
verdict, with costs, was given for the plaintiffs, by which the validity of
the patent is fully established .... ,,154
The aspect of the case that created its import within patent law
was Mansfield's famous jury instructions. After instructing the jury
that they should avoid two false extremes in their deliberations-"to
deprive the inventor of the benefit of his invention for sake of the
public" and to permit "monopolies of what is in use and in the trade,
at the time they apply for the letters patent"-Mansfield instructed
the jury that a plaintiff-patentee must meet three conditions in order
to prevail.155 Mansfield asked of the jury:
1. whether "the defendant did use that which the plaintiff claims
to be his invention";
2. "whether the invention was new or old"; and
3. "whether the specification is such as instructs others to make
it.,,156
With respect to the third condition-the validity of the
specification-Mansfield elaborated (as if speaking to the inventor)
that "you must specify upon record your invention in such a way as
shall teach an artist, when your term is out, to make it-and to make
it as well as you by your directions: for then at the end of the term,
the public have the benefit of it.' 157  With these instructions,
Mansfield established the rule in patent law that a valid specification
serves as the consideration for a patent grant. "For the first time,"
writes MacLeod, "the recognized quid pro quo for the award of a
patent was the disclosure of the invention." 158
MacLeod is actually overstating the case somewhat. As I
indicated above, the specification had been around for more than 150
years, appearing in Sturtevant's patent, in Garill's aborted patent
application, in Nasmith's patent, and in the dispute over Dr. James'
patent. Moreover, Mansfield had been adjudicating patent cases for
154. Hulme, Patent Law, supra note 92, at 284.
155. Id. at 285.
156. Id. I will discuss the first and second conditions when I discuss the evolution of the
requirement of novelty.
157. Id.
158. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 49.
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several decades by the time of Liardet v. Johnson, and he had been
referring to the specification as a standard for determining a
legitimate patent throughout these earlier cases. For example, in
Yerbury v. Wallace (1768), in Taylor v. Luckett (1770), and in Horton
v. Harvey (1781), Mansfield had overseen trials in which plaintiff-
patentees lost their cases due to various deficiencies in their
specifications. 159 The difference with Liardet was that it was the first
case in which Mansfield's jury instructions-explaining the
significance of the specification-were published in newspapers and
pamphlets and thus widely distributed among jurists and laity alike.160
This, however, simply raises the question: why would Mansfield
be drawn to the specification as the consideration for a patent grant?
MacLeod believes the specification arose in the early to mid-
eighteenth century due to the division of responsibilities for patent
issuance and enforcement between different institutional actors. 16'
This may very well be true, but it does not explain why Mansfield
reinterpreted patent doctrine so that the specification became the
consideration offered by the patentee in exchange for his monopoly.
A potential insight is offered by a contemporary commentator who
remarks that the "few precursors of the patent specification [in the
seventeenth century] were seeds that fell on rocky ground."' 62  I
agree, and posit that the ground was rocky because it lacked the rich
soil of the proper theory that would nourish the seeds and help them
grow.
The underlying theory for Mansfield's view on the role of the
specification in patent law was enunciated even further in subsequent
patent cases. In Turner v. Winter (1787), counsel for plaintiff,
responding to an inquiry made by Justice Buller, argued that "[t]he
consideration which the patentee gives for his monopoly is, the
benefit which the public are to derive from his invention, after his
patent is expired; and that benefit is secured to them by means of a
159. 1 OLDHAM, supra note 132, at 733. These cases are not reported, and they were
only recently discovered in Mansfield's notebooks by Oldham. For instance, the note for
Horton v. Harvey says: "[There were] additions in 6 months, before the patent... That
improvement [is] not in the specification. Nonsuit." Id. at 762.
160. Hulme, Patent Law, supra note 92, at 284 n.1 and accompanying text.
161. See MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 51, 53 (noting that the rise of the specification
requirement "helped shift responsibility from the law officers to the courts" and thus
"offered a mechanism whereby the system could be self-policing and the law officers be
spared much tedious investigation").
162. Walterscheid, Part 3, supra note 1532, at 786 (citing D.S. Davies, The Early History
of the Patent Specification, 50 L.Q.R. 86,272 (1934)).
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specification of the invention.' 63 In his jury instruction, Justice
Buller commented that "[w]henever it appears that the patentee has
made a fair disclosure, I have always had a strong bias in his favour;
because in that case he is entitled to the protection which the law gives
him."164
Justice Buller had the opportunity to oversee another path-
breaking patent case eight years later in Boulton & Watt v. Bull
(1795). With the precedents of Liardet and Turner firmly established
at this point, Justice Buller could safely declare that "[t]he
specification is the price which the patentee is to pay for the
monopoly."' 65 Lord Chief Justice Eyre would also state in this case
that "[t]he modem cases have chiefly turned upon the specifications,
whether there was a fair disclosure.' 66 By 1795, the common-law
courts had formulated the rule that the specification must disclose the
invention in order for there to be a valid patent. Walterschied writes:
"Liardet v. Johnson led the way, but by the end of the [eighteenth]
century it had become settled law that the consideration for the
patent was not the working of the invention per se but rather the
disclosure of how to make and use it in the specification."'167
The shift in the consideration for the patent grant from working
the monopoly grant to disclosure of the invention is well-known
historical fact. Moreover, the fact that this shift occurred over the
span of time that patents themselves shifted from bona fide royal
prerogative to common-law right is also historical fact. I believe that
the shift to the common-law courts facilitated the shift to the
specification requirement because common-law judges in the
eighteenth century were more likely to approach this issue from a
theoretical framework of natural rights, including social contract
notions and John Locke's labor theory of property.
The influence of the ideas of natural rights philosophy upon
British political and legal culture is not indirect or dubious. In the
eighteenth century, there is ample evidence that politicians, jurists
and the hoi polloi were either reading the relevant philosophical
tracts or were exposed to the ideas through the general culture.168
Regardless of how they acquired the ideas of the natural rights
163. Turner v. Winter, 1 Carp. P.C. 105,109, 99 Eng. Rep. 1274,1276 (K.B. 1787).
164. 1 Carp. P.C. at 111, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1277 (emphasis added).
165. Boulton & Watt v. Bull, 1 Carp. P.C. 117,126,126 Eng. Rep. 651, 654 (C.P. 1795).
166. Boulton & Watt, 1 Carp. P.C. at 145, 126 Eng. Rep. at 665.
167. Walterscheid, Part 3, supra note 1532, at 801.
168. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
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philosophers, these people were applying these new theories to the
political and legal issues of their day. Patents were no exception.
Beginning in the early eighteenth century, various people began
to argue that inventors had a right to the property substantiated in
their inventions. Even commentators would cast the claims of
inventors as a right to their property (secured by their patent). For
instance, an author in the early nineteenth century explained an early
eighteenth-century patent dispute in the following terms: "[Ralph]
Shaw .... was constantly objecting to every trifling improvement, as
an infringement on his patent, and threatening his neighbours with
suits in equity, to protect his sole rights .... ,u69 Patent-holders in the
eighteenth century were also wont to speak in such terms. In 1784,
James Watt mentioned the difficulty of suing infringers of his patents
at the risk of having his patents voided through a judicial scrutiny of
his specifications: "we had better bear with some inconvenience than
lose all [in a law suit], yet if we do not vindicate our rights we run a
risk of losing all that way. 170 A year later, Watt wrote in a letter that
"if our right to our patent should be taken away, or rendered illusive,
we must drop any further pursuits of that scheme and apply ourselves
to other businesses where our property can be more effectually [sic]
guarded. ' 171  Such sentiments are a radical departure from the
petitions for privileges and the decrees of royal privileges issued from
the Privy Council in the prior century.
Although she agrees with the common view that natural rights
did not influence the development of patent doctrine, MacLeod
identifies numerous references to the (natural) property rights of
inventors throughout the eighteenth century. The earliest such
reference she finds is in a 1712 pamphlet, entitled "Reasons for the
bill entituled, A bill for securing to Mr John Hutchinson the property
of a movement invented by him for the more exact measuring of
time."' 72 In 1722, a subscription society sought to sponsor inventors
with monetary rewards; the rewards would be issued "where the
property cannot be secured to the inventor by a patent."'173 An
169. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 71 (quoting SIMEON SHAW, HISTORY OF THE
STAFFORDSHIRE POTTERIES 147 (1829)) (emphasis added). For more on the resulting
case of Mitchell v. Shaw (1736), see infra note 115 and accompanying text.
170. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 68 (quoting a letter from James Watt to J. McGrigor
(October 30,1784)) (emphasis added).
171. DUTrON, supra note 6, at 109 (quoting a letter from James Watt to Lord
Loughborough (July 7,1785)) (emphasis added). Watt was writing shortly after one of his
patents had been voided.




inventor's application for a patent in 1724 stated that he sought a
patent "for securing to him the property in the practice of the said
method."' 74 Adam Smith would write in 1762 that "the property one
has in a book he has written or a machine he has invented, which
continues by patent in this country for fourteen years, is actually a
real right."'75 In 1774, W. Kenrick-MacLeod refers to him as a
"Doctor of Laws"-maintained that inventors have an "equal claim
to the natural rights of genius" and a "superior right to public
encouragement [based] on principles of political expediency.' 76 In
1791, a publication on the subject defined a patent as "a grant of the
crown substantiating private property.' 177 Finally, Joseph Bramah
wrote in 1797 in response to Chief Justice Eyre's views on patents
expressed in Millar v. Taylor that "invention... those efforts of the
mind and understanding... may justly be denominated the right of
every individual,... unconnected with any political regulation.' 78
From these statements, MacLeod concludes that "it remained
unclear what [these claims of a right to property] might mean, since
the inventor's property was unprotected in law until he bought its
certification from the crown in a patent. This was not directly tested
in the courts."' 79 MacLeod is certainly correct that there is no judicial
proclamation in the eighteenth century in the exact linguistic terms:
''patents are a property right." Yet this hardly means that there was
an absolute intellectual cleavage between the eighteenth-century
judge-made rules concerning specification and novelty and natural
rights theories.
Patent disputes that reached the bench at this time were
extremely fact intensive and as a matter of course accentuated
technical issues touching upon mechanical designs or upon
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 11 (R. L. Meek et al.
eds., 1978)) (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 199 (quoting W. KENRICK, AN ADDRESS TO THE ARTISTS AND
MANUFACTURERS OF GREAT BRITAIN 2 (1774)) (emphasis added). In this statement,
Kenrick was comparing inventors to authors, who were explicitly accorded recognition of
their natural right to property in their written works. See Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303,
2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201,202 (K.B. 1769).
177. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 199 (quoting OBSERVATIONS ON THE UTILITY OF
PATENTS, AND OF THE SENTIMENTS OF LORD KENYON RESPECTING THAT SUBJECT 42
(4th ed. 1791))
178. Id. (quoting a letter from Joseph Bramah to the Rt Hon. Sir James Eyre 77
(1797)).
179. Id. at 198, She thus concludes: "Justification of patents by a natural-rights
argument was never common in England, and fell into disuse in the early nineteenth
century." Id. at 199.
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distinctions between prior inventions or practices 'and the patentee's
improvement thereto. Thus such issues as the details of the
specification, the testimony of experts and the question of novelty
predominated. As such, these cases did not lend themselves very
easily to a disquisition on the nature of an inventor's property right in
his invention or to the articulation of the philosophical framework for
this legal device. Even the discussions of the contractual role of the
specification by Buller and Mansfield consist of short statements
sandwiched between their discussion of the technical facts of the
case. 80
The question thus remains: What might motivate Mansfield and
Buller to reinterpret the specification as the inventor's consideration
for his patent? What would serve as the soil that would allow the
seeds of the early inventors filing specifications to grow into a
revolution in patent doctrine? 181 The reader should recall Justice
Buller's comment in Turner v. Winter that "[w]henever it appears that
the patentee has made a fair disclosure, I have always had a strong
bias in his favour, because in that case he is entitled to the protection
which the law gives him."'182 What gives the patentee entitlement-a
moral claim-to the protection of the law?
The answer is: a Lockean conception of a social contract.
Locke's political theory, especially his concept of the social
contract, permeated English political and legal thought in the
eighteenth century. 183 Plucknett notes that "in the eighteenth century
it was ... John Locke's influence which was paramount, for it was he
who discovered a reasonable philosophical basis for the whole of the
seventeenth-century history, and more particularly for the Revolution
of 1688."184 Holdsworth also comments that "Locke's views.., have
had an enormous influence both in England and abroad."' 85  In
180. Supra notes 153-67 and accompanying text.
181. The "few precursors of the patent specification [in the seventeenth century] were
seeds that fell on rocky ground." Walterscheid, Part 3, supra note 12, at 786 (citing D.S.
Davies, The Early History of the Patent Specification, 50 L.Q.R. 86,272 (1934)).
182. Turner v. Winter, 1 Carp. P.C. 105, 111,99 Eng. Rep. 1274, 1277 (K.B. 1787).
183. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 21-41, 94-115; THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1776). See also Cato's Letters, a series of letters published in the
London Journal in the 1720s that expounded upon natural rights and limited government.
"[A]s Happiness is the Effect of Independency, and Independency the Effect of Property;
so certain Property is the Effect of Liberty alone, and can only be secured by the Laws of
Liberty; Laws which are made by Consent, and cannot be repealed without it." Cato's
Letter No. 68 (March 3, 1721), reprinted in THE ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE 177,
178 (David L. Jacobsen ed. 1965).
184. PLUCKNETT, supra note 26, at 62.
185. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 287.
providing the principal justification for the Glorious Revolution and
the following rise of parliamentarian rule, Locke's political
philosophy was an ubiquitous fact of British political and legal culture
in the eighteenth century.
This moral and political backdrop to the legal adjudication of
patent rights is revealed explicitly in a 1774 debate in the House of
Lords over the nature of an author's property right to his written
work.8 6 In a telling admission, two lords acknowledged during the
debates that they were willing to consider that "previous to the
monopoly statute, there existed a common-law right, equally to an
inventor of a machine and an author of a book."'187 MacLeod
concludes from this that
the opinion which prevailed was that the author's natural right in
his literary property ceased on publication of his manuscript, in the
same way that an inventor's did when he revealed his secret. Their
only subsequent property was the temporary one secured to the
author under the Copyright Act and to the inventor by a patent
granted under the Statute of Monopolies. 88
The claim that an inventor's natural right terminates in the legal
arrangement of disclosing his invention in exchange for a legal right,
i.e., a patent, conforms perfectly with the Lockean conception of the
original social contract.
Locke's "strange doctrine" that each individual possessed in the
state of nature the executive power to enforce his natural rights to
life, liberty and property 89 was no longer thought so strange in the
years following his death in 1703. His unique conception of the state
of nature meant that the essence of crossing over into civil society
required each person "to quit his Executive Power of the Law of
Nature, and to resign it to the publick," upon which "he authorizes
the Society, or which is all one, the Legislative thereof to make Laws
for him as the publick good of the Society shall require."'190 Thus, the
creation of civil society necessarily implicates the exchange of man's
186. 17 COBBETT's PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 954-1003 (1813).
187. Id. at 974, 982. By the eighteenth century, the rule of the common law was the rule
of reason, and reason was the law of nature and the source of natural rights; thus, for the
Lords to admit to a "common law right" is equivalent to an admission of a "natural right."
See BLACKSTONE, supra note 13; JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 6,
at 270-71 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690).
188. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 198-99.
189. LOCKE, supra note 187, §§ 8-9,13, at 273,275.
190. Id. § 89, at 325. See also id. §§ 97-99, at 232-33.
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natural rights for civil rights because this is the only way to resolve
the inherent inefficiencies and problems of the state of nature.191
This exchange of natural rights for civil rights is not a sacrifice of
a man's rights per se because the ultimate goal of civil society is "the
mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call
by the general Name, Property."'19 However, one of the two powers
that man has in the state of nature-"to do whatsoever he thinks fit
for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of
the Law of Nature"-he expressly "gives up, when he joyns in a...
Political Society, and incorporates into any Commonwealth." 193
Locke explains further:
The first Power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the
Preservation of himself, and the rest of Mankind, he gives up to be
regulated by Laws made by the Society, so far forth as the
preservation of himself, and the rest of that Society shall require;
which Laws of the Society in many things confine the liberty he had
by the Law of Nature.194
This is certainly not an invitation, however, for allegedly valid
violations of man's rights by civil government. Later in the Second
Treatise, Locke explicitly limits the power of government such that it
"cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without his own
consent. For the preservation of Property [is] the end of
Government." 195
Yet Locke still recognizes a circumscribed range of governmental
activities that could delimit its citizens' property rights without their
literal consent. As long as the legislature works according to
"promulgated establish'd Laws" and does not act arbitrarily, it may
tax with the consent of the citizens, "i.e., the Consent of the Majority,
giving it either by themselves, or their Representatives chosen by
them."'1 96 This implies that the government may regulate property
insofar as the legislature acts without caprice and by laws enacted
191. ld. §§ 124-27, at 350-52.
192 Id. § 123, at 350.
193. 1& § 128, at 352. The other power is "the power to punish the Crimes committed
against that Law." Id.
194. Id § 129, at 352-53.
195. ld § 138, at 360-61. See also id. § 139, at 361. Moreover, the end of government is
not merely the protection of physical property; for Locke, "property" is synonymous with
all of man's rights. See id § 87, at 323 ("Man... hath by Nature a Power ... to preserve
his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate"); id. § 123, at 350 ("Men enter into civil
society for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the
general Name, Property.").
196. Id. § 142, at 363 (emphasis added).
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through the consent of the majority, or in the alternative, through the
consent of the majority of representatives.
This moral and political schema, albeit quite abbreviated in my
presentation, easily justifies the Statute of Monopolies as a valid
regulation of property for the "publick good." Not only was the
Statute enacted by the subjects' representatives in Parliament, but it
was also enacted to serve as an explicit limitation on the past abuse of
the royal prerogative. 197 The Statute defined the legal conditions
under which a patent for an invention would be issued and further
authorized that this patent would henceforth be adjudicated by the
common-law courts; in essence, it created a civil right of patents for
inventions. This is why the Lords were willing to concede in 1774 that
an inventor had a (natural) right to his invention before the Statute of
Monopolies, but not subsequent to its passage in 1623. The Statute of
Monopolies transformed this natural right into a legal right, i.e., a
civil right adjudicated in civil society.
Moreover, the conception of patent grants in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries-a monopoly privilege granted under the royal
prerogative in exchange for the establishment of an industry in the
realmh-does not fit into the Lockean conception of a social contract.
As plaintiff's counsel argued in a patent case in 1807:
[C]onsidering the case of a patent not in the light of monopoly, as it
had before been put by the judges, but as a bargain with the public;
the specification, therefore, to be construed upon the same
principle of good faith that regulates all of other contracts; and if
the disclosure is such that the invention can be communicated to
the public, the statute is satisfied.198
The barristers explicitly distinguished between a monopoly grant and
a bargain with the public. By 1807, the view of patent grants as
comprising royal monopoly privileges was hoary, and the reigning
viewpoint was that a patent represented a social contract
implemented by way of the specification.
This is why Justice Buller is strongly biased in favor of inventors
who have properly exchanged their specification for a right to their
invention-a validly obtained patent. In another patent case in 1785,
Lord Loughborough would explain the normative force of the social
contract at work in the legal interpretation of patents:
197. Locke maintains that the "Prerogative is nothing but the Power of doing publick
good without a Rule." Id. § 166, at 378. Thus, if the king abuses his prerogative in acting in
ways that harms the "publick good," then the People may define "by positive laws" the
bounds of the power. Id. § 163, at 376-77.
198. Harmar v. Playne, 1 Carp. P.C. 246,257 (Chanc. 1807).
[Vol. 52
August 2001] RETHINKING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENTS 1301
The law has established the right of patents for new inventions; that
law is extremely wise and just. One of the requirements is, that a
specification shall be enrolled, stating the nature of the invention,
the object of which is, that after the terms is expired the public shall
have the benefit of the invention; but without that consideration is
complied with, the patentee forfeits all the benefit he derives from
the Great Seal.199
An inventor who discloses his invention via a specification has
entered into a social contract, and thus the inventor is morally entitled
to the benefits of this contract, i.e., legal protection of his patent right.
The Lockean influence underlying Mansfield's requirement that
a specification be exchanged for the patent right is further revealed
by Hulme's own "economic objections" to this requirement. Hulme
writes that Mansfield's requirement "attaches an undue importance
to the patent specification, the value of which is mainly contingent
upon successful working."2°°  Yet this criticism only makes sense
insofar as one is approaching patents from the old perspective of a
royal prerogative as opposed to the modem perspective of a legal
right. The working of the patent was a principal justification for
patents only when the crown issued them to industrialists in order to
establish (monopolized) industries within the realm. Under the royal
prerogative of the crown, the natural rights of the inventors were
moot.201 By the late eighteenth century, however, inventors could
claim a natural property right to their invention and a moral
entitlement to the legal protection of this right under the Statute of
Monopolies. The alleged "undue importance" of the patent
specification is no more than the judge's concern that the contract
that beget the inventor's civil rights represents a valid exchange
between the two parties-society and the inventor.
None of the foregoing analysis, of course, is intended to suggest
that common-law judges were explicitly applying a Lockean notion of
a social contract to their understanding of patents. The law reports
are filled with comments that indicate precisely the opposite.20
199. Arkwright v. Nightingale, 1 Carp. P.C. 38, 49-50 (C.P. 1785).
200. Hulme, Privy Council Part II, supra note 101, at 194.
201. Or worse, they were an impediment to the crown's belief in its plenary power to
grant such privileges. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Boulton & Watt v. Bull, 1 Carp. P. C. 117, 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P. 1795)
(counsel for defendant referring to "this privilege of a monopoly which is to be granted by
the Crown"); 1 Carp. P.C. at 154 (Chief Justice Eyre concluding "let it be remembered,
that though monopolies in the eye of the law are odious, the consideration of the privilege
created by this patent is meritorious, because, to use the words of Lord Coke, 'the
Inventors also intermingled references to "property rights" along with
references to "privilege. '20 3 Moreover, I do not wish to imply that
other views and theories on the development of the specification as
consideration of a patent are wrong. To the contrary, economic and
institutional explanations elucidate many facets of the development
of this legal doctrine.
I would like to suggest, however, that natural rights philosophy
revolutionized English legal thinking in many ways, some more
nuanced than others. As the earlier quotes indicated, natural rights
were both explicitly and implicitly in people's minds with respect to
patents in the eighteenth century. Many judges, members of
Parliament, inventors and commentators were advocating or arguing
from the general philosophic framework created by the natural rights
philosophers. Although these ideas may not have taken hold
explicitly in patent doctrine, I would argue that it provided a
background for easily justifying and understanding the development
of the specification requirement as consideration for patents.
B. Novelty: Applying a Labor Theory of Property to Legal Doctrine
Hulme's second economic criticism of Mansfield's work in patent
law serves as a natural segue into the second issue that evidences the
influence of natural rights philosophy upon the development of
patent doctrine at law. Hulme writes that under Mansfield's "systems
of Examination for Novelty... the inventor is debarred from
incorporating in his claims unused public knowledge. ' '2°4 Again, this
criticism only makes sense if one maintains the old perspective of
patent monopolies as serving the purpose of establishing or re-
establishing industries within the realm. In this context, any unused
public knowledge should be fair game for a patent monopoly because
it furthers the re-introduction of manufactures. By the eighteenth
century, however, patents were no longer the handmaidens of the
importer or of the restorer of manufactures from the days of yore. To
the contrary, "the view became accepted," writes Walterschied, "that
inventors... were perceived to be creative in their own right as
inventor bringeth to, and for, the commonwealth, a new manufacture by his invention,
costs, and charges."')
203. See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent
Law: Antecedents (Part 4), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 77, 82 (1995)
[hereinafter Walterscheid, Part 4] (in the same letter in which Watt argued for better
protection of his "right to [a] patent" he also referred to "the security we imagined these
exclusive [patent] privileges gave").
204. Hulme, Privy Council Part II, supra note 101, at 195.
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individuals. '" 20 5 In the eighteenth century, patents rewarded the past
labor of the inventor, not the future introduction of an industry. It is
the second part of my thesis that the background theory that helped
motivate this shift in patent doctrine was Locke's labor theory of
property.
The concept of novelty-that the patent go to only the "true and
first inventor"-had been slowly developing since the Statute of
Monopolies made this an official, legal requirement of patent
grants.206 The reader may recall the discussion of the patent grants
either voided or upheld in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries on the grounds of evidence, or the lack thereof, of prior use
of the patented invention.2 7 These actions portended what would
come to pass by the end of the eighteenth century.
I should also note that this requirement of novelty is not the
same requirement that was enforced under Queen Elizabeth's initial
patent grants. Under the royal prerogative, the requirement was only
that there was no current use of the trade;208 the argument for this
requirement resting principally on the customary restraint that the
crown cannot impinge on a subject's right to work in his respective
trade. The requirement of novelty as it develops in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth century maintains that any prior
use-regardless of whether the use had gone out of existence-would
void a patent grant. The argument for this new requirement rests
principally on the idea that patents should go to only the first inventor
qua inventor. By the end of the eighteenth century, the limitation on
prior use had been transformed into a requirement of true
innovation, i.e., novelty.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the picture
was slightly different. At this time, there were two requirements of
the early patent grants that remained in use: first, in accordance with
Bircot's and Matthey's cases, an inventor could not patent a "mere
improvement," and second, the importer was on the exact same
footing as the true inventor or discoverer because both were
responsible for bringing a new industry to the realm. Still, the cases
from the late seventeenth century were slowly pushing patent law in
the direction of a new novelty requirement. This admixture of old
205. Walterscheid, Part 4, supra note 203, at 103-04.
206. Supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
207. Supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text.
208. "Neither in Bircot's case or in Coke's commentary do we find any trace of the
doctrine that proof of prior publication would [ ]void a patent." Hulme, Patent Law, supra
note 92, at 281.
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and new elements of patent doctrine is captured in Holdsworth's
description of how the Privy Council applied the "first and true
inventor" requirement of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies:
The question whether an invention was sufficiently novel was made
to depend, not on prior publication, but wholly on the question
whether or not there had been a prior user in England; and the
invention must be wholly new-not merely a small improvement
upon an older invention.209
Holdsworth's statement succinctly summarizes the limitation of
Bircot's case, the conflation of inventors and importers under
"inventor," and the (new) emphasis on true innovation. Yet by the
late eighteenth century, it is the prohibition on patenting anything in
which there "had been a prior user" that comes to take center stage in
patent doctrine. Novelty joins the specification as one of the two
principal elements used by the courts to determine whether a patent
grant was valid or not.
An unreported case from the late seventeenth century reaffirmed
that importers were equal recipients of patents because they
introduced new industries into the realm. The case was Edgeberry v.
Stephens (1691).210 Carpmael's Report summarizes the holding of the
case:
A grant of a monopoly may be to the first inventor.., and if the
invention be new in England, a patent may be granted though the
thing was practised beyond the sea before; for the statute speaks of
new manufactures within this realm, so that, if they be new here, it
is within the statute: for the Act intended to encourage new
devices useful to the kingdom, and whether learned by travel or by
study, it is the same thing.21'
This case reaffirms the purpose of the old patent doctrine and of the
Statute of Monopolies, i.e., to encourage industry or trade useful to
the kingdom obtained through either travel or study.
The inclusion of importers within the meaning of the term
"inventor" was not new; it is in fact the modern definition of
"inventor" that is unique in its narrow sense of creation.212 I would
209. 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 354.
210. The date is provided by MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 68. She calls the case
"Edgebury v. Stephens."
211. Edgeberry v. Stephens, 1 Carp. P. C. 35, 91 Eng. Rep. 387 (K.B.). Carpmael does
not provide a date for the case, and neither does Hulme in his brief discussion of the
patent and its litigation, although he does suggest possibly 1688. See Hulme, Privy
Council, supra note 96, at 71-72.
212. Walterscheid, Part 2, supra note 24, at 855-56, n.25. See also supra notes 36-37 and
accompanying text.
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argue that the implicit premise underlying the holding of Edgeberry v.
Stephens is that patents reward the inventor's work, and it is for this
reason that patents for new manufacture in the realm can be
extended to either a true inventor (in the modem sense) or an
importer. Both types of people labor to bring their respective
manufacture or trade to England. I noted earlier that the idea that
patents should, in part, reward past labor was an idea introduced to
Queen Elizabeth by Jacob Acontius. This idea was repeated in some
of Elizabeth's patent grants, it was repeated in the decision in
Clothworkers of Ipswich and Coke reiterated this as one of the
justifications for monopolies in his Institutes.213 Thus, the idea that
inventors should have their labor rewarded was well established by
the time Edgeberry v. Stephens was decided.
What was new was that this case was decided around the time
that Locke published his Two Treaties of Government (1690), and it is
within these books that England is introduced to a new conception of
the source of one's moral entitlement to property: labor.214 The
reward of labor that brings new manufacture to the realm, or results
in innovative creations, will thus take on new emphasis and
importance. If this is the case, then one should expect to find
increasing emphasis on innovation-novelty-as the source of one's
claim to a patent. This is in fact what one finds.
During the first half of the eighteenth century, there are
increasing numbers of patents either defended or revoked on the
basis of the requirement of novelty. In Mitchell v. Shaw (1736),
Hulme reports that a patent was challenged and in a jury trial "[p]rior
use was proved and a verdict was passed for the plaintiff," i.e., the
patent was revoked.2 5 In 1745, an employee obtained a patent for a
powered tape loom that he had invented, stating that the patent was
"got in my name because [my employer] could not make oath that he
invented it."'216 In 1743, the precedent of Bircot's case most likely
served as the basis for the court's revocation of a patent for a plough
213. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
214. Grotius only identified the source of property in "occupation." Pufendorf
identified the source of property in work, but he did not explain the mechanics of how this
plays out in the world. Locke is the first natural rights philosopher to provide an
explanation for both the source and the means to a natural property right. See generally
STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY: GROTIUS TO
HUME (1991).
215. Hulme, Privy Council Part II, supra note 101, at 189. Hulme also notes that "this
is the first instance of the revocation of a patent by an Assize Court." Id.
216. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 53 (citing Henry Trueman Wood, The Inventions of
John Kay (1704-70), 60 J. ROYAL SOC'Y ARTS 81-82 (1911)).
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design; the court noted, that the plough "was not substantially and
absolutely a new invention but barely and only a small additional
improvement on an old invention, such as was frequently made on
many other utensils in husbandry. 217
Despite the increasing judicial cognizance of novelty, it would
not be until the work of both Mansfield and Buller that this issue took
on the character of a complete legal requirement-repeating the same
pattern we saw with respect to the specification. It was apparently
standard practice for patentees to argue before Mansfield that their
invention was completely novel. In Morris v. Oldham (1776), for
example, the patentee quickly established at the beginning of
arguments that "[there] never had [been] an idea of it before," and
that "[n]o such [machine was] ever used or known before. 2 18 Still,
the impediments of the early patent doctrine remained, and
Mansfield would eventually have to deal with them.
This occurred in 1776, when Lord Mansfield conducted a jury
trial in which the plaintiff had sued the defendant for infringing his
patent.2 19 The arguments at trial centered on the sole issue of novelty.
Defendant's counsel argued straight from Coke's analysis of the
Statute of Monopolies in the Institutes: "[For this] patent [to be]
good, it must be substantially and essentially newly invented.120
Defendant's counsel was also adept at the case law, and with his
knowledge of Bircot's case he also argued from the alternative:
"Suppose this [invention is] new-[it] is an addition to an old
invention, ergo not the subject of a patent.1221 Mansfield's notes
conclude with the comment: "A very good Special Jury gave, and
rightly: Verdict: Plaintiff, £ 500. 1222
What Mansfield's notes do not explain is why the jury gave a
verdict for the plaintiff. Fortunately, this explanation is provided by
Justice Buller's reference to Morris in a later case:
217. Id. at 68. The author does not give a case citation and refers to the dispute as only
Stanyforth's case. Moreover, MacLeod does not give any additional quotes from the
decision, and thus it is unclear if the court explicitly relied on Bircot's case in coming to its
decision. Nonetheless, even if the court did not explicitly invoke this precedent, it appears
that it is using it (and the plaintiff in the case did invoke it on his own behalf).
218. 1 OLDHAM, supra note 132, at 740 (bracketed terms in original).
219. Morris v. Bramson, 1 Carp. P. C. 30 (1776). The case is actually unreported, and
Carpmael's Reports simply reprint the famous, oft-quoted statement by Justice Buller in
Boulton & Watt v. Bull about Mansfield's statement in Morris. However, there are
significant notes on Morris in Mansfield's notebooks, reprinted in 1 OLDHAM, supra note
132, at 745.
220. 1 OLDHAM, supra note 132, at 745.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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Lord Mansfield said, after the former trial on this patent, "I have
received a very sensible letter from one of the gentlemen who was
upon the jury, on the subject whether on principles of public policy
there can be a patent for an addition only. I paid great attention to
it.... If the general point of law, viz., that there can be no patent
for an addition be with the defendant, that is open upon the record,
and he may move in arrest of judgment. But that objection would
go to repeal almost every patent that ever was granted."..... Since
that time it has been the generally received opinion in Westminster
Hall, that a patent for an addition is good, but then it must be for
the addition only, and not for the old machine too.a23
With Mansfield's reply to a question from a jury member, the
precedent of Bircot's and Matthey's cases were overruled. Mansfield
admittedly rejected these earlier cases on the grounds of public policy
and he did not invoke any natural fights ideas in making this
argument-noting only the slippery slope that such rules would
repeal almost every patent grant. Regardless, this was a significant
step toward a true requirement of novelty.
The reason is that Bircot's case carried with it the baggage of the
early patent doctrine, i.e., the mandate that the crown cannot infringe
a subject's right to work in his chosen trade. This was the justification
for these early cases, which is explicitly stated in Matthey's case. The
alleged infringement of the subjects' fight to work, however, was
becoming much less of an issue in the eighteenth century. An
example of this trend is the defeat of a proposed bill in the Commons
in 1738; the Act, if passed, would have prevented the introduction of
machine looms in explicit protectionist zeal for those who wove by
hand. During the debate, the argument for the right to work was
actually carried in favor of those who wove silk and mohair by
machines:
[W]e make an encroachment, Sir, upon the private property of our
fellow subjects. We deprive them of the natural right which every
man in a land of liberty ought to enjoy, of gaining bread in an
honest and lawful way. Nay more, Sir, we give a total
discouragement to any future improvement of arts and
manufacture.2 24
Once again, the natural right to property is invoked to defend those
who invent and introduce new manufactures in the land. This is a
decidedly different approach to inventive and manufacturing activity
223. Morris, 1 Carp. P. C. at 34 (emphasis added). See supra note 219.




than in the prior centuries. The difference was natural fights
philosophy, and with the overturning of Bircot's rule, a true
inventor-regardless of whether his labors produced an entirely new
machine or merely an improvement to an old approach-could claim
an entitlement to a patent given the novelty of his innovation.
In Liardet v. Johnson, the implication of overruling Bircot's case
are seen in Mansfield's jury instructions.225 With respect to novelty,
Mansfield instructed the jury as follows:
Is it a new invention? Is it new? For if it is new and good for
nothing, nobody will make use of it. The great point is, is it a new
thing in the trade, or was it used before and known by
them? ... And it is material... that in all patents for new
inventions, if not really new discoveries, the trade must be against
them; for if it is an old thing it is a prejudice to every man in the
trade; it is a monopoly.226
The standard for novelty is no longer whether the invention violates
the practice of a trade at the time of the grant, but rather novelty is
now tested solely in terms of whether the invention was "used before
and known by" those in the trade. This means: is the patented
product the result of the inventor's own labor? The test of whether
this is the case is whether there was anyone at any time in the past
that knew about or used the patented invention within the realm. If
yes, the invention is not the result of the inventor's own labors and
thus he failed to rightfully earn his patent. This requirement easily
fits into the Lockean moral and political schema that maintains that
an individual's right to his property is grounded in the labor that
begets property itself.
In what sense does Locke's labor theory of property underlie this
reasoning? The oft-quoted passage from the Second Treatise reads as
follows:
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be comon to all
Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no
Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and
the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever
then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and
left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him
removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this
labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of
225. Supra note 156 and accompanying text.
226. Hulme, Patent Law, supra note 92, at 286-87. Note also that Mansfield explicitly
identifies an invalid patent grant as a "monopoly."
[Vol. 52
August 2001] RETHINKING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENTS
other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of
the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once
joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in
common for others.22 7
The argument for "mixing labor" is often derided by commentators as
nonsensical,m but this is an inordinately literal reading of Locke that
fails to take into account the historical and philosophical context of
his argument. Stephen Buckle correctly observes that "[t]he doctrine
of the origin of property through labor will not be properly
understood if it is not recognized that Locke thinks of labour as a
rational (or purposeful), value-creating activity. '22 9
In fact, all of the references to labor in the Second Treatise
exemplify productive activities, e.g., hunting animals for food and
clothing, gathering vegetables and plants for food, cultivating land,
etc.230 In other words, "mixing labor" is Locke's metaphor for
production or productive activities. Or as Justice Erle wrote in 1854:
"The origin of the property is in production."' 31 It is for this reason
that Buckle refers to Locke's theory of property as the "workmanship
model.,,232
It is this emphasis on production in the labor theory of property
that gives property its normative force within Locke's moral
philosophy. When man labors in the world to create products for his
use, he is in fact laboring to create products necessary to live. Labor
is thus a moral activity because production is necessary for the
preservation of man's life-the fundamental moral duty of natural
law.233
Additionally, the "mixing labor" argument integrates with
Locke's labor theory of value and thus explains why he is so
interested in making the case "that of the Products of the Earth useful
to the Life of Man 9/10 are the effects of labour."'234 Locke believes
227. LOCKE, supra note 187, § 27, at 287-88.
228. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 175 (1974); Karl
Olivecrona, Locke's Theory of Appropriation, 24 PHIL. Q. 220 (1974); Jeremy Waldron,
Two Worries About Mixing One's Labour, 33 PHIL. Q. 37 (1983).
229. BUCKLE, supra note 214, at 151 (emphasis added).
230. See LOCKE, supra note 187, §§ 26,28,29,30,32,37,38,40,42,43,46, at 286-300.
231. Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815, 867,10 Eng. Rep. 681, 702 (1854) (speaking of the
origin and development of copyright).
232. BUCKLE, supra note 214, at 151.
233. LOCKE, supra note 187, § 32, at 291 ("God, when he gave the World in common to
all Mankind, commanded Man also to labour, and the penury of his Condition required it
of him. God and his Reason commanded him to subdue the Earth, i.e., improve it for the
benefit of Life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour.").
234. Id § 40, at 296.
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that labor creates value because "labor" means "production," i.e., the
creation of new materials for maintaining human life and happiness.
Tully writes that
it does not seem to be Locke's view that a person mixes his labour
with a preexisting object which persists through the activity of
labouring. Rather, he sees the labourer as making an object out of
the material provided by God... in a manner similar to the way in
which God makes the world out of the prior material He created.235
Thus labor creates new products that expand man's ability to
successfully live, and this creates new values in the world, such as
buildings, central heat, automobiles, markets, and all of the
accouterments of modern life. This is also why Locke believes that in
the late seventeenth-century America, "whom Nature having
furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of
Plenty, ... a King of a large and fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges
and is clad worse than a day Labourer in England.''26 In comparing a
English day laborer to an American-Indian "king," Locke is
explaining that the values created by labor in civil society made it
possible to live more successfully than individuals still struggling in
the state of nature. Labor creates value because this term means
productive activity. The root of property is production, and
production is a creative activity that fulfills the natural law injunction
that man must preserve his life.
Insofar as this reasoning was the fountainhead of Mansfield's and
Buller's development of the modem notion of novelty, then this
requirement would have consisted of two prerequisites: first, that the
inventor create through his own labor the patented item or
improvement, and second, that the inventor can only patent the
material expression of his labor, i.e., the product, machine, or actual
mode of manufacture. The former requirement is established in
Mansfield's jury instructions in Liardet and in the other eighteenth-
century cases that began to develop the new requirement of novelty.
The latter is expressed in a variety of other cases beginning in the
middle of the eighteenth century, including, as early as 1758,
235. JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY 116-17 (1980).
236. LOCKE, supra note 187, § 41, at 296-97. It is with fascinating prescience that Locke
writes: "For I ask, What would a Man value Ten Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand
Acres of excellent Land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with Cattle, in the middle
of the in-land Parts of America, where he had no hopes of Commerce with the other Parts
of the World, to draw Money to him by the Sale of the Product?" Id, § 48, at 301. It was
in fact the development of commerce and trade-elements of productive activity-that
lead to the creation of the vast cattle ranches within the United States of America.
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Dollond's case. In citing to this case in his decision in Boulton &
Watt, Justice Buller remarked that:
As Dollond first made public, he was held to be considered as the
first inventor. Dollond's telescopes are certainly a manufacture
within the statute 21st James I [i.e., the Statute of Monopolies].
They consist of principles reduced into form and practice, and the
patent is for glasses completely formed, not for mere principles.237
Buller may have chosen to speak in the specific terms of the Statute
of Monopolies, but he is explicitly using the Lockean argument that
production is the result of purposeful action to create new products,
and that it is only the products of this action that are an entitlement of
the creator.
This interpretation is confirmed in Buller's lengthy opinion in
Boulton & Watt. The dispute among the judges in this case was
whether the patent was invalid because its specification described a
method as opposed to a particular product. From a Lockean
perspective, this is a simple but important distinction; in essence, it is
the distinction between the idea in an individual's mind that guides
his productive action and the results of that action. The former is not
property, but the latter is. This philosophic perspective supports
Justice Buller's argument that
[t]he very statement of what a principle is proves it not to be a
ground for a patent: it is the first ground and rule for arts and
sciences, or in other words, the elements and rudiments of them. A
patent must be for some new production from those elements, and
not for the elements themselves. 23
Buller concludes this line of thought: "the true foundation of all
patents... must be the manufacture itself."' 39 As Locke writes in the
Second Treatise: "From all which is evident,.. . Man (by being
Master of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person, and the Actions
or Labour of it) had still in himself the great foundation of
Property.'240 Man has within him the foundation of property-his
mind and the ideas that guide his labor-but these are not property
themselves. The product-the manufacture-is the property that an
inventor may patent.
In advancing this distinction, Justice Buller is in fact responding
to Chief Justice Eyre's own stated position in Boulton & Watt that
"Dollond's patent was perhaps objectionable, being for the method of
237. Dollond's Case, 1 Carp. P. C. 28,30 (1758) (as reported in Boulton & Watt v. Bull).
238. Boulton & Watt v. Bull, 1 Carp. P. C. 117,139,126 Eng. Rep. 651, 662 (C.P. 1795).
239. 1 Carp. P. C. at 140,126 Eng. Rep. at 663.
240. LOCKE, supra note 187, § 44, at 298.
producing a new object-glass instead of being for the new object-glass
produced." 241 Dollond's patent was in fact sustained at trial, but
regardless of what happened almost fifty years earlier, both Buller
and Eyre reveal their Lockean premise that inventors can only have
the products of their labor patented, not the processes or ideas that
lead to that product or manufacture. Eyre even acknowledged that
the court in the present case is engaging in a "narrow construction of
the word 'manufacture' in this statute,"242 referring, of course, to the
Statute of Monopolies; this statement reveals that Buller and the
court are not engaging in an obvious interpretation of the Statute's
use of the term "manufacture." What would motivate them to
narrowly construe the Statute of Monopolies to validate patent grants
for only products and manufactures? The Lockean view that labor
begets property by creating a new existing product in the world-a
product that the creator is entitled to claim as his own.243
Some judges went even further in explicitly invoking the idea
that an inventor has a right to his patent. In the case of Arkwright v.
Nightingale, Lord Loughborough proclaimed: "The law has
established the right of patents for new inventions; that law is
extremely wise and just."244 Moreover, he specifically instructed the
jury that "[w]e must never decide private rights upon any idea of
public benefit. I must tell the jury that they must shut out that part of
the argument." 245  Later in his instructions, he reiterated that
"nothing could be more essentially mischievous than that questions of
property between A and B should ever be permitted to be decided
upon considerations of public convenience or expediency. 246
Lord Loughborough's strong words in favor of property rights in
patents shed light upon Chief Justice Eyre's complaint in Boulton &
Watt that Coke's Institutes "say[] little or nothing of patent rights as
241. Dollond's Case, 1 Carp. P. C. at 30.
242. Boulton & Watt, 1 Carp. P. C. at 149,126 Eng. Rep. at 665.
243. "One's own"-suum--to the natural rights philosophers was the moral claim to
one's life and liberty, and which served as the basis for claiming "property"-dominion-
in the world. See BUCKLE, supra note 214, at 29-32,77-81. Grotius explains how the suum
is extended over material objects to create dominion: "For the end of society is ... to
preserve to every one his own.... For the free use of life and limbs [is] the right of every
one, that it could not be infringed or attacked without injustice. So the use of the common
productions of nature [is] the right of the first occupier, and for any one to rob him of that
was manifest injustice." GROTIUS, supra note 114, Bk. I, Ch. 2, § i, at 33. This is the basis
for Locke's own arguments on the development of natural property rights.
244. Arkwright v. Nightingale, 1 Carp. P. C. 38,49 (C.P. 1785).
245. Id. at 47.
246. Id- at 50 (emphasis added).
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opposed to monopolies."2 47 The reader should also remember that
Lord Mansfield explicitly distinguished between a patent right and a
monopoly grant in his jury instructions in Liardet.248 The patent
monopolies of Queen Elizabeth and King James were now explicitly
distinguished from the patents for inventions being adjudicated in the
common-law courts at the end of the eighteenth century. Although
past commentators have explained this break between early patent
doctrine and modem patent doctrine in constitutional, economic and
institutional terms, the arguments and terminology of the judges
easily fit within a framework of Locke's natural law thought.
C. Conclusion: The Emergence of Patent Law Doctrine Under the
Influence of Natural Rights Philosophy
By the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the
nineteenth century, numerous judges, including Mansfield and Buller,
either subconsciously or deliberately used the terminology and
arguments of Locke's natural rights philosophy to develop their two
requirements for patents: specification and novelty. The natural
rights influence in the development of modem patent doctrine is in
fact encapsulated in a portion of Lord Ellenborough's decision in the
case of Huddart v. Grimshaw (1803). In this dispute over a patent for
a new form of manufacturing cables, Lord Ellenborough states:
In inventions of this sort, and every other, through the medium
of mechanism, there are some materials which are common, and
cannot be supposed to be appropriated in the terms of any patent.
There are common elementary materials to work with in
machinery, but it is the adoption of those materials, to the
execution of any particular purpose, that constitutes the invention,
and if the application of them be new; if the combination in its
nature be essentially new; if it be productive of a new end, and
beneficial to the public, it is that species of invention, which,
protected by the King's patent, ought to continue to the person the
sole right of vending it, but if prior to the time of his obtaining a
patent, any part of that which is of the substance of the invention
has been communicated to the public in the shape of a specification
of any other patent, or is a part of the service of the country, so as
to be a known thing, in that case he cannot claim the benefit of his
patent; ... and if in stating the means necessary to the production
of that end [in the specification], he oversteps the right, and
247. Boulton & Watt, 1 Carp. P. C. at 145, 126 Eng. Rep. at 665 (emphasis added).
248. Supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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appropriates more than is his own, he cannot avail himself of the
benefit of it.249
If the patented invention is "essentially new" and "productive," then
the inventor has engaged in the appropriate labor that justifies his
moral claim to his patent right, i.e., he ought to have his fourteen-year
patent. The structure of Lord Ellenborough's argument-his
premises-reflect the normative framework of Locke's labor theory
for property.
Beyond this simple argumentative structure, however, Lord
Ellenborough explicitly reveals his Lockean commitments at the end
of this passage by the words "oversteps the right, and appropriates
more than is his own," which paraphrase Locke's "enough and as
good" proviso on the appropriation and creation of property in the
state of nature. In the Second Treatise, Locke explains that original
labor and appropriation in the state of nature is bounded by the
injunction of the Law of Nature prohibiting waste. He writes:
The same Law of Nature, that does by this means [i.e., labor] give
us Property, does also bound that Property too. God has given us
all things richly .... But how far has he given it to us? To enjoy.
As much as an one can make use of to any advantage of life before
it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever
is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others2 0
Locke explains a few sections later that in the early stages of the state
of nature, man properly acquired property in objects through labor,
"[b]ut if they perished, in his Possession, without their due use.., he
offended against the common Law of Nature, and was liable to be
punished; he invaded his Neighbour's share, for he had no Right,
farther than his Use called for any of them."5 1 That is, in the early
stages of the state of nature, any appropriation through labor beyond
man's needs-thus leading to waste-infringed other men's right to
use those objects for their own lives. In other words, a man acts
contrary to the natural law if he appropriates more than is his own.
Even the expression "his own" betrays Ellenborough's reading of the
natural rights philosophers, who believe that dominion (property) is
the result of extending suum (one's own) over material products3252
249. Huddart v. Grimshaw, 1 Carp. P. C. 200,225 (K.B. 1803) (emphasis added).
250. LOCKE, supra note 187, § 31, at 290.
251. Id. § 37, at 295. To preclude misinterpretations of Locke's political philosophy, the
common use-right in the state of nature is transformed into an exclusive property right
when man labors on both land and chattel, and this process logically culminates in the
development of money and an advanced economy that expands production and allows
man to transcend the spoilage proviso. See id §§ 34-48, at 291-301.
252. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
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The ideas of Locke permeated both the arguments and the
terminology of the judges adjudicating patent cases at the end of the
eighteenth century. Locke's ideas are expressed in the way the judges
conceived of the role of specification in terms of a social contract
between the patentee and the public. Moreover, Locke's unique
theory that property is created through "mixing labor" manifests
itself in the ways the judges speak of the novelty requirement, i.e.,
insofar as the patentee must prove that his product never existed in
past use or knowledge, he must then earn his patent by proving that it
truly is the result of his own labor.
D. The Arguments Against Natural Rights: The Limits of Intellectual
History
Nonetheless, the evidence for the positivist position that natural
rights philosophy did not contribute to the growth or development of
patents as a legal doctrine is strong and I do not wish to indicate
otherwise.
One common interpretation of eighteenth-century patent
doctrine is that patents evolved according to a utilitarian framework
with the inventor being granted a reward in exchange for the benefit
that accrued to the public.253 There is evidence that supports this
contention within the cases. For example, Justice Ashhurst, in a
companion case to Boulton & Watt, began his remarks with the
observation that "[e]very new invention is of importance to the
wealth and convenience of the public; and when they are enjoying the
fruits of an useful discovery, it would be hard on the inventor to
deprive him of his reward."' z 4 Moreover, Jeremy Bentham gave his
imprimatur to this justification for patents.25
Even more damaging to the claim that natural rights influenced
patent doctrine are the arguments proffered by judges in the
eighteenth century that explicitly argued to the contrary. In the
famous copyright case of Millar v. Tayler (1769), counsel for plaintiff
253. This is a common interpretation of the American legal provision for patents. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
254. Hornblower & Maberley v. Boulton & Watt, 1 Carp. P. C. 156, 158, 101 Eng. Rep.
201,202 (K.B. 1799).
255. "A man will not be at the expense and trouble of bringing to maturity [an]
invention unless he has a prospect of an adequate satisfaction, that is to say, at least of
such a satisfaction as to his eyes appears an adequate one, for such troubles and
expenses." DUTTON, supra note 6, at 19 (citing 1 J. BENTHAM'S ECONOMIC WRITINGS
262 (W. Stark ed., 1952)). Dutton also claims that Adam Smith supported the utilitarian
justification for patents, but this is a surprising claim given Adam Smith's claim that
patents are a "real right." See SMITH, supra note 175.
argued for the proposition "that there is a real property remaining in
authors, after publication of their works. '"z56 This claim was defended,
in part, by arguing "from the case of MECHANICAL
INVENTIONS; where it is admitted, 'that the rule does not hold.'
Yet the same rule ought to hold.., and a great deal of mental labour
is often bestowed upon mechanical inventions, as well as upon literary
productions. ' '257 The plaintiff's appeal to a natural right to property
both in written works and in inventions was explicitly based upon
Lockean grounds, i.e., on the fact that these things are products of
mental labor. Thus this argument forced the judges to consider
whether inventors had a claim of property in their inventions.
Although Justice Willes, Justice Aston, and Lord Mansfield
agreed with the plaintiff that there was, at a minimum, a common-law
right to an author's work, Justice Yates was unconvinced and argued
forcefully in dissent against the plaintiff. He remarked: "All
property has its proper limit, extent, and bounds. Invention or labour
(be they ever so great) cannot change the nature of things; or
establishe a right, where no private right can possibly exist." 58 He
then highlighted a central weakness in the claim that there exists a
natural right in invented or authored works: it cannot be property
because it is incapable of exclusivity-the alleged right lacks
"corporeal substance." 259 Notably, Justice Yates cites Pufendorf on
property, but he does not refer to Locke.260 His concluding remarks
are pointed: "The whole claim that an author can really make, is on
the public benevolence, by way of encouragement; but not as an
absolute coercive right. His case is exactly similar to that of an
inventor of a new mechanical machine.1261 Thus, Yates concludes that
any rights given to inventors or authors are simply statutory rights
predicated upon considerations of utility or public benevolence.
256. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303,2304, 98 Eng. Rep. 201,202 (K.B. 1769).
257. Id. It should be noted that Blackstone was one of the counsel for plaintiff
advancing this proposition. 4 Burr. at 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. at 202.
258. 4 Burr. at 2357, 98 Eng. Rep. at 230.
259. 4 Burr. at 2362, 98 Eng. Rep. at 233.. Justice Yates's discussion on this point spans
several pages. 4 Burr. at 2360-67, 98 Eng. Rep. at 232-36..
260. 4 Burr. at 2363,98 Eng. Rep. at 233 ("For property, as Pufendorf observes, implies
a right of excluding others from it. For, without that power, the right will be insignificant.
it will be vain to contend that 'that is your own,' which you cannot prevent others from
sharing in.").
261. 4 Burr. at 2386, 96 Eng. Rep. at 246. Yates goes to say that the only right an
inventor or an author have is "a right to determine 'whether the world shall see [their
creation] or not."' Id.
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These arguments cannot be ignored because they are part of the
historical record that constitutes the development of patents.
Nonetheless, the significance of such sentiments should not be
overstated. Just as Mansfield admonished the jury in Liardet to avoid
two false extremes in adjudicating a patent dispute, a student of
intellectual history should avoid the false dichotomy of either
ignoring contrary sentiments or over-emphasizing the impact of such
contrary sentiments. Such statements need to be placed in their
proper context.
While it is true that no judge declared in a single sentence that
inventors have a natural right to their patented inventions, this does
not mean that explicit references to privilege or utilitarianism win by
default as the ultimate justifications for the development of a legal
doctrine for patents. Ideas often work in interesting and subtle ways,
and statements by philosophers do not always filter through society in
exactly their original form.262 A judge does not need to explicitly
invoke Locke or the phrase "natural rights" in order to be thinking in
such terms 63
A comment by Holdsworth indicates why there is a glaring
absence of direct citation to or quotation of Locke in judicial opinions
in the eighteenth century. He writes that Locke "makes no attempt
to determine how disputes as to the limits of the natural rights of the
subject are to be settled. '2z64 In this respect, Locke is a political
theorist and not a legal philosopher. This means that he provides a
theoretical justification for the original definition of natural rights,
particularly property rights, and of the civil society based thereon, but
he does not go into any lengthy exegeses on the nature of contractual
promises, marriage, prices of commodities or other legal issues that
are rife in Pufendorf's treatises.265 Thus when an eighteenth-century
judge was faced with a generic legal issue, requiring adjudication
262. See the title essays in AYN RAND, PHILOSOPHY. WHO NEEDS IT (1982), and AYN
RAND, FOR THE NEW INTELLECrUAL (1961). The essays in both of these works explain
why and how abstract philosophical principles originally enunciated in philosophers' tracts
eventually filter down through a culture.
263. Identifying the underlying premises at work in historical events is a common task
of intellectual history. Although not engaged in the study of ideas in history, the positive
economic analysis of the law engages in a similar task when it purports to show that "many
areas of the law, especially-but by no means only-the great common law fields of
property, torts, crimes, and contracts, bear the stamp of economic reasoning." RICHARD
A. POSNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 18 (2d ed., 1977).
264. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 286.
265. See, e.g., SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN 80-83, 93-
104, 120-23 (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., 1991) (1673); Pufendorf, supra
note 124, at 165-73,191-201.
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based upon pre-existing legal standards, then citations to Pufendorf
or even sometimes to Grotius were in order. However, when a judge
was faced with an original question of defining a legal right-such as
the situation in the late eighteenth-century concerning the legal
enforcement of patent rights-he will first reason from the political
principles that serve as the foundation for his understanding of legal
requirements. It is in this respect that Locke played a greater
supporting role in the development of the modem law of patents than
any of the other natural rights philosophers.2 66
I believe that I have shown that a substantial portion of the
defining statements in modem patent doctrine-Mansfield's jury
instructions in Liardet and Buller's decision in Boulton & Watt, to
name a few-were in fact predicated upon underlying premises of
natural rights and social contract theory. These judicial statements
represent principles best exemplified in Locke's seminal work in 1690.
Similar claims were made by inventors and jurists in the prior two
centuries (Jacobus Acontius is one shining example), but without
Locke's original explanation for how labor creates property rights,
these arguments lacked the theoretical support to convince their
opponents and thus fell upon deaf ears. Most important, as long as
patents were viewed as monopoly privileges bestowed by the Crown
at pleasure, even if this pleasure was limited somewhat by the
customary rights of Englishmen, patents would never have developed
into the legal doctrine of protecting invention that it had become by
the end of the eighteenth century. Once patents were taken up by the
common-law courts in toto, the eighteenth-century judges were free
to apply their assumptions about society and rights to this new and
untested common-law doctrine. The result was the specification and
novelty requirements-seeds planted in the seventeenth century that
eventually sprouted in a soil enriched with Lockean theories about
natural property rights and civil society.2 67
So how to explain the sentiments of Justice Eyre and the
nineteenth-century commentators quoted in the introduction to my
paper? At any time there will always be dissenters to a prevailing
intellectual approach, e.g., Marx and Engels were writing at the
heyday of the Industrial Revolution and "freedom of contract" in
both England and America. Since the theoretical foundations of
266. I am presupposing in this statement that the reader remembers my earlier
comments on the omnipresence of Lockean political theory in English government in the
eighteenth century.
267. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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patent law were largely unstated and untested in the eighteenth
century, dissenting views were probably more common and notable.
But the definition of a dissenter is one is who 'is speaking against the
prevailing doctrines of his day. The fact that Justice Erye was
speaking in dissent of his brethren perhaps reflects the proper status
of his views. From an historical perspective, it is not to Justice Eyre
but to Lord Mansfield and Justice Buller that we look today for the
first and influential statements of modern patent doctrine.
With respect to the nineteenth-century commentators, they were
writing at the beginning of the period (continuing to this day) in
which positivist theories waxed and natural law and natural rights
theories waned.268 If later nineteenth-century jurists and lawyers
turned against the doctrine of natural rights and its accompanying
social contract theory as the justification for patents, this does not
change the fact that such ideas still played a role in the pivotal
eighteenth-century cases that created this doctrine. It would be
anachronistic to superimpose an utilitarian thesis upon a development
couched in the terms of natural rights theories. If one properly traces
the development of patents from the sixteenth century through the
eighteenth century, then the momentous changes that took place over
these years can be sufficiently explained by the role of the natural
rights philosophers within this period of English history.
Conclusion
This Article began with a well-known historical fact: patents
were transformed between 1550 and 1800 from royal grants of
privilege into legal contracts between inventors and society. Despite
the fact that this transformation occurred over the same period as the
natural rights revolution in English law (1600-1800), twentieth-
century commentators have universally denied any relationship
between these coeval events. Thus in writing this Article, I have not
sought to displace the prior work in the history of patents as much as
I have sought to fill what I perceive as a glaring gap in scholarship.
The historical record for patents, especially the early patent
doctrine of Queen Elizabeth and King James, has been extensively
surveyed since Hulme's first essays on the subject at the end of the
nineteenth century. Yet the later historical record, although well
mined by MacLeod, Dutton and others, fails to consider the work of
268. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED
(Wilfried E. Rumble ed., 1995) (1832) (Hobbesian legal positivism); JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859) (utilitarian justification for social freedom).
any of the natural rights philosophers. None of either Grotius' or
Pufendorf's remarks on monopolies appear in any twentieth-century
writings on the history of patents, and Locke is represented by a
single quote in the third to last page in MacLeod's otherwise excellent
survey of the history of patents. These philosophers appear nowhere
within the pages of Dutton's book, nowhere within the recent four-
part series of articles by Walterschied, and surprisingly, nowhere
within the pages of Fox's treatise despite his own oblique reference to
the natural rights foundation of patents in his first chapter. Yet
everyone appears to be satisfied with repeating the oft-stated claim
that natural rights had no influence on the development of modem
patent doctrine. Drawing heavily upon the historical record already
established by historians, and adding some additional research of the
relevant philosophers and the relevant patent cases, I believe I have
uncovered evidence, at a minimum, of a prima facie case for the
proposition that there very well may have been a link between the
two.
Although the first patents were grants of royal monopoly
privileges to individuals who promised to establish a hitherto foreign
or unknown trade within the realm, the eighteenth century is the
period in which patent doctrine is burned pure of its function as a tool
of royal prerogative. Two-hundred years after the first letters patent
for invention, patents became explicit legal tools for promoting and
protecting an inventor's property right in his creation. This
distinction is evident in Mansfield's own words, distinguishing a
legally valid patent for invention from a patent for monopoly
deserving of being voided as illegal and unjust.269
In investigating why this was the case, I found evidence of
striking similarities between the arguments proffered by judges for
the new common-law requirements of novelty and specification and
the theories of Locke. Lord Mansfield's explicit legal formulation of
the specification as consideration for a social contract between
patentee and society mapped very well upon the social contract
theory propounded by Locke in the Second Treatise. The
development of the requirement of novelty by Mansfield and Buller
was stated in terms that reverberated with the ideas, and sometimes
the words, of Locke's labor theory of property.
Outside of the judiciary, inventors in the eighteenth century were
invoking Lockean arguments in the justification of their activities and
their claim to a right thereto. Joseph Bramah, an inventor in the late
269. Supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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eighteenth century, writes in 1797 that "[i]nvention [are] those efforts
of the mind and understanding which are calculated to produce new
effects from the varied applications of the same cause," and the cause
was man's mind.270 Bramah then asked: "At what point of creation
do the works of men begin?" His answer:
Just where the independent works of God end, who by his own
secret principles and methods.., established the elements and their
properties, and stocked the universal storehouse already
mentioned; out of which the same creating will directs every man to
go and take materials, fit in kind and quality, for the execution of
his design.271
More than a century before Bramah penned these words, Locke
wrote that God had created the universe in which natural law
mandated that man labor (as a purposeful, rational activity) and
thereby produce the products necessary for sustaining human life. In
a culture steeped, at least since the Glorious Revolution, in Lockean
ideals, the argument for legal protection of a property right in
inventions received its normative force from the notion that
productive labor is the fountainhead of innovation.
As noted in the introduction to this Article, this identification
comprises an historical truth, and is distinct from the proposition that
there is in fact a natural right to one's inventions, mechanical or
otherwise. In other words, recognizing that natural rights philosophy
influenced the historical development of patents is separate from
recognizing that natural rights is a valid justification for issuing
patents to protect property rights in inventions. The former is a
factual determination made on the basis of the historical record, and
the latter is a philosophical determination that can only be made on
the basis of normative principles. This article has addressed the
historical truth and has left the normative issue for other papers to
investigate.272
The recognition of this historical truth, however, has import
beyond its significance for historians and their academic kin. If
270. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 220 (quoting the letter from Bramah to the Rt. Hon.
James Eyre, at 77).
271. Id- (quoting the letter from Bramah to the Rt. Hon. James Eyre, at 83).
272. There is quite a bit of Lockean analyses of intellectual property rights, including
patents. See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 41-72
(1996); Adam D. Moore, Toward a Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, in
INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, LEGAL AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 81
(Adam D. Moore ed., 1997); James W. Child, The Moral Foundations of Intangible
Property, 73 THE MONIST 578 (1990); Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property,
18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1989).
natural rights ideals influenced the development of modem patent
doctrine, which I believe I have shown, then this suggests that the
inventor's property right in an invention deserves a place in the
ongoing debate over the definition and reformation of patent rights.
Thus far, constitutional, institutional and economic arguments have
dominated the field,273 but the provenance of patents indicates that
the argument for an inventor's moral right to the property
substantiated in his invention should complement these analyses. 274
Thus, in the recent debates over business method patents and
computer patents in the Internet age, for instance, the moral claim to
the product of one's labors should not be ignored. The intellectual
contributions of Lord Mansfield and Justice Buller to this field of law
deserve no less.
273. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.
J. 577 (1999); James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., March 12,2000,
at 44; Lawrence Lessig, The Problem with Patents, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, April 23,
1999; Jeff Bezos, An Open Letter from Jeff Bezos on the Subject of Patents, at
http:llwww.amazon.comlexec/obidoslsubst/misc/patents.html (last visited December 15,
2000)
274. PETER MEINHARDT, INVENTIONS, PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 16 (1946) ("one of
the grounds why an inventor is entitled to a reward is intrinsically a moral and ethical
ground, and not exclusively of an economic nature."). Meinhardt's declaration that there
is a "moral right of the inventor to his invention" is, unfortunately, an uncommon
viewpoint in patent treatises published in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Id.
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